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Lost at Sea: The Continuing Decline of 
The Supreme Court in Admiralty 
MICHAEL SEVEL* 
For the first 200 years of its history, the United States 
Supreme Court served as the primary leader in the develop-
ment of, and its cases the primary source of, the admiralty 
and maritime law of the United States. That appears to be 
changing. The Court’s admiralty cases over the last quarter 
century indicate that it is slowly giving up its traditional 
leading role in creating and developing rules of admiralty 
law, and instead deferring to Congress to make those rules, 
a trend that is tantamount to abandoning its Article III con-
stitutional duty to serve as the country’s only national admi-
ralty court. Some scholars believe that this trend is just as it 
should be. It has been recently argued that the Court’s two 
centuries of federal common lawmaking in admiralty is, and 
always has been, unconstitutional, and ought to be curtailed 
with few exceptions. Federal admiralty law should therefore 
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be “normalized” and brought into conformity with the same 
principles of federalism and separation of powers which 
govern most other areas of federal law. This Article exam-
ines the Court’s most recent admiralty case, Lozman v. City 
of Riviera Beach, Florida, and argues that it represents a 
striking escalation in the Court “normalizing” federal ad-
miralty law. The many objectionable features of Lozman, 
however, form the basis of a pragmatic argument against the 
Court adopting a normalization approach. In largely ignor-
ing hundreds of years of its own cases, the Court’s reasoning 
was arbitrary, unpredictable, and provides virtually no 
guidance to the state and lower federal courts. Properly un-
derstood, the troubling aspects of the case justify a return to 
the Court’s traditional, constitutionally prescribed role of 
making rules of decision in admiralty in the manner of a 
common law court. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For the first 200 years of its history, the United States Supreme 
Court served as the primary leader in the development of, and its 
cases the primary source of, the admiralty and maritime law of the 
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United States. This claim is not the outcome of a creative scholarly 
interpretation of its cases; nor is it wishful thinking rooted in an ac-
tivist ideology. Article III of the U.S. Constitution provides that 
“The judicial power shall extend. . . to all cases of admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction.”1 It is commonly acknowledged that this is 
the only subject matter grant of jurisdiction in the Constitution.2 
There is also broad consensus that Article III establishes a constitu-
tional duty on the Court to make, develop, and apply the general 
maritime law of the United States.3 In recognition of this duty, the 
Court itself has self-identified as the primary lawmaking body in 
admiralty for virtually its entire history. Because “the Judiciary has 
traditionally taken the lead in formulating flexible and fair remedies 
                                                                                                             
 1 U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2. 
 2 See THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 1 (5th 
Hornbook ed. 2012) (“This grant of judicial power is the only instance where the 
Constitution delegates jurisdiction over an entire subject matter to the federal ju-
diciary.”). 
 3 See Madruga v. Super. Ct., 346 U.S. 556, 566 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting) (“[f]rom the admiralty clause of the Constitution, this Court has drawn 
probably greater substantive law-making powers than it exercises in any other 
area of the law.”); see also Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 
451 U.S. 77, 95–96 (1981) (“We consistently have interpreted the grant of general 
admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts as a proper basis for the development 
of judge-made rules of maritime law.”) It is often said, correctly, that the unique 
subject matter grant of jurisdiction grounds the duty of the Court to make general 
admiralty law. See Steven F. Friedell, The Diverse Nature of Admiralty Jurisdic-
tion, 43 ST. LOUIS L. J. 1389, 1391 (1999); Note, From Judicial Grant to Legis-
lative Power: the Admiralty Clause in the Nineteenth Century, 67 HARV. L. REV. 
1214, 1230–37 (1954). It has been objected to this view that the admiralty clause 
is not a unique subject matter grant, and that other jurisdictional grants in Article 
III are similarly subject matter grants. For example, it is suggested that the grant 
of federal question jurisdiction equally refers to a discrete subject matter, and, 
further, and that given the many and various tests of admiralty jurisdiction drawn 
by the federal courts over the years, the result is that “admiralty. . . is largely a 
place – not a subject.” See Ernest Young, The Last Brooding Omnipresence: Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins and the Unconstitutionality of Preemptive Federal 
Maritime Law, 43 ST. LOUIS L. J. 1349, 1351 n.14 (1999). This view takes an 
unnecessarily capacious view of ‘subject matter.’ The clauses establishing federal 
question jurisdiction— extending the judicial power to cases arising “under this 
Constitution” and under “the laws of the United States” (U.S. CONST. art. III, 
§ 2)—refer not to the subject matter, but the sources, of those laws. By contrast, 
the phrase “admiralty and maritime” (Id.) refers not to a source of law, nor merely 
to a place, but to a distinctive, stable, but evolving, set of activities, industries, 
practices, and customary norms arising from those practices. 
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in the law maritime,”4 it has always been the case that “the prepon-
derant body of maritime law comes from this Court and not from 
Congress.”5 As recently as 2008, the Court recognized that “mari-
time law. . . falls within a federal court’s jurisdiction to decide in the 
manner of a common law court, subject to the authority of Congress 
to legislate otherwise if it disagrees with the judicial result.”6 The 
Supreme Court has therefore long been, and has acknowledged itself 
to be, the American High Court of Admiralty, as one prominent ad-
miralty scholar recently put it.7 
That appears to be changing. The Court’s admiralty cases over 
the last quarter century indicate that it is gradually giving up its tra-
ditional leading role in creating and developing rules of admiralty 
law. In short, the Court is increasingly relying on Congress to take 
the lead in crafting the substantive rules of admiralty law, and is 
stepping in to make law only interstitially in applying federal stat-
utes, as it has long done in many other areas of federal law. The 
general maritime law of the United States—a body of general, 
judge-made law developed from centuries-old transnational custom-
ary legal principles8—appears to be slowly but steadily on its way 
out.9 
                                                                                                             
 4 McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 207 (1994) (quoting United 
States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 409 (1975)). 
 5 Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 323 (1955) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 
539, 550 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“No area of federal law is judge-
made at its source to such an extent as is the law of admiralty.”); Fitzgerald v. 
United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963) (“Congress has largely left to this 
Court the responsibility for fashioning the controlling rules of admiralty law.”). 
 6 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 489–90 (2008). 
 7 See David W. Robertson, Our High Court of Admiralty and its Sometimes 
Peculiar Relationship With Congress, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 491 (2011). See also 
Hon. John R. Brown, Admiralty Judges: Flotsam on the Sea of Maritime Law?, 
24 J. MAR. L. & COM. 249 (1993). 
 8 See James Allsop, Maritime Law: The Nature and Importance of its Inter-
national Character, 84 AUST. L. J. 681, 682–87 (2010) (discussing the history of 
adoption of international general maritime legal principles by U.S. federal courts 
since the eighteenth century); WILLIAM TETLEY, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME AND 
ADMIRALTY LAW 5–32 (Yvon Blais ed., 2002) (discussing the history of transna-
tional general maritime legal principles from ancient times to the present). 
 9 The clearest beginning of the trend is Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 
U.S. 19, 36 (1990) (“We sail in occupied waters. Maritime tort law is now domi-
nated by federal statute, and we are not free to expand remedies at will simply 
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Some scholars believe that this trend is just as it should be. It has 
been recently argued that the Court’s two centuries of federal com-
mon lawmaking in admiralty is, and always has been, unconstitu-
tional, and ought to be curtailed with few exceptions. As the view’s 
most articulate proponent has suggested, federal admiralty law 
should accordingly undergo a process of “normalization,” whereby 
it conforms to the orthodox, post-Erie10 view that there is no “gen-
eral” federal law of any kind, law which can be made entirely inde-
pendent of Congressional action, and which also pre-empts state law 
in a manner identical to federal statute. The argument for normali-
zation suggests that therefore the federal courts should have highly 
circumscribed common lawmaking powers across all areas of fed-
eral law, including admiralty.11 
I will argue that the Court’s most recent admiralty case, Lozman 
v. The City of Riviera Beach, Florida,12 represents a striking escala-
tion in a trend of normalization in admiralty law by the Supreme 
Court, and therefore signals a decisive shift away from the Court 
playing its constitutionally prescribed and traditional role of making 
and developing federal admiralty law independently of Congress. In 
                                                                                                             
because it might work to the benefit of seamen and those dependent upon them. 
Congress has placed limits on recovery in survival actions that we cannot ex-
ceed.”), but one federal circuit judge has argued that the trend extends as far back 
as Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978) (holding that the Death 
on the High Seas Act implicitly precludes the availability of nonpecuniary dam-
ages for loss of society under the general maritime law). See also Brown, supra 
note 7, at 277–78. 
 10 See Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that fed-
eral courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction do not have the power to create federal 
common law). 
 11 Ernest A. Young, It’s Just Water: Toward the Normalization of Admiralty, 
35 J. MAR. L. & COM. 469, 471 (2004): 
I conclude that admiralty’s ‘special’ constitutional status cannot 
be justified, and that reforming admiralty may point the way 
toward salutary changes in our foreign affairs jurisprudence. In 
particular, the same basic constitutional rules about preemption 
and federal lawmaking that govern ordinary domestic law 
should govern both these areas. Both admiralty and foreign af-
fairs law need to be ‘normalized.’ 
See also infra note 171. 
 12 133 S. Ct. 735 (2013). 
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Lozman, the Court faced one of the most fundamental questions of 
any body of maritime law: what is a vessel?13 And despite having 
nearly 150 years of its own precedent on which to rely,14 the Court 
determined that its sole task was to provide an interpretation, uncon-
strained by and unrelated to precedent, of the definition of the term 
“vessel” as it appears in the Rules of Construction Act,15 a statute 
originally enacted in 1873 but, notably, not fully embraced by the 
Court until 2005 as providing the default definition of “vessel” to be 
applied throughout the U.S. Code.16 As a result of this narrowly con-
ceived judicial task in Lozman, the Court articulates a test for vessel 
status, the “reasonable observer” test,17 virtually ex nihilo, bearing 
no relation to any principle it has ever recognized in its over two 
hundred-year history as an admiralty court. Not surprisingly, state 
and lower federal courts have subsequently struggled in finding a 
consistent meaning and application of this test.18 
The principled scholarly arguments for normalizing admiralty 
law are subtle and complex, and a comprehensive response to them 
will have to wait for another occasion. In what follows, however, I 
will make two arguments about the connection between Lozman and 
the normalization of admiralty law by the Supreme Court. First, I 
                                                                                                             
 13 See Id. at 739. 
 14 The Court’s earliest cases addressing vessel status are The Plymouth, 70 
U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865) (holding that damage to a warehouse caused by a fire on 
a ship did not fall within admiralty jurisdiction) and The Rock Island Bridge, 73 
U.S. 213 (1867) (holding that a bridge extending over water is not a vessel). How-
ever, the earliest case of any precedential significance is Cope v. Vallette Dry-
Dock Co., 119 U.S. 625 (1887). 
 15 1 U.S.C. §3 (2012) (defining “vessel” as including “every description of 
watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means 
of transportation on water.”). 
 16 See Stewart v. Dutra Construction Company, 543 U.S. 481, 489–90 (2005). 
Although the Court in Stewart acknowledged that “Section 3 merely codified the 
meaning that the term ‘vessel’ had acquired in general maritime law” (Id., at 490), 
the full embrace of 1 U.S.C. §3 as generally applicable throughout the U.S. Code 
can itself be taken as a deliberate step in the direction of normalization. Id. 
 17 Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 741. 
 18 See David W. Robertson and Michael F. Sturley, Recent Developments in 
Admiralty and Maritime Law at the National Level and in the Fifth and Eleventh 
Circuits, 40 TUL. MAR. L. J. 343, 392–93 (2016) (discussing the influence of Loz-
man on how state and federal courts have struggled to apply the “reasonable ob-
server” test.) 
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argue that the Lozman case, in which the Court radically and unpre-
dictably shifted the boundaries of the admiralty jurisdictional tests 
which depend upon vessel status, is best explained by the Court’s 
adoption of a strategy of normalizing in admiralty—in this case, to 
defer to Congress to take the lead in defining what is a vessel, and 
for the Court to engage in common lawmaking only interstitially and 
as Congress clearly intends. The Court, from the beginning of the 
case, understood its task narrowly, as merely an exercise in statutory 
construction, and not also aiming at having its reasoning and con-
clusion cohere with over a century of precedent; it then developed a 
test for vessel status that has no discernable basis in either the 
Court’s jurisprudence or federal statute. These and other aspects of 
the case are explainable only in terms of its implicit acceptance of 
the view that federal admiralty law should be normalized. Second, I 
will argue that these troubling aspects of Lozman, coupled with the 
apparent and unusual carelessness displayed by the Court in review-
ing the case,19 constitute an argument against the normalization of 
admiralty. While there may be principled reasons to resist normali-
zation, Lozman suggests a pragmatic argument against that ap-
proach: adopting it encourages the Court to abandon its history as a 
national admiralty court and to develop unprincipled and arbitrary 
rules of decision, amounting to an abandonment of the constitutional 
duty to develop a uniform, coherent general maritime law of the 
United States. 
In Parts I–II, I briefly set out the relevant legal and procedural 
background leading up to the Lozman judgment. In Part I, I review 
the relevant federal law determining vessel status at the time of the 
Court’s granting of certiorari on Lozman. In Part II, I evaluate the 
reasons for and against the granting of certiorari, and conclude that 
the ex ante case for certiorari was dubious at best. I then adduce 
evidence, based on both the oral argument of Lozman and extra-ju-
dicial statements of Chief Justice Roberts, which indicates that the 
Court did not take review of the Lozman case seriously, and that it 
did not sufficiently appreciate the significance and possible ramifi-
cations of its ruling for the coherence of the larger body of federal 
admiralty law. In Part III, I critically discuss Justice Breyer’s major-
ity opinion in the case, in which the Court invents a new test for 
                                                                                                             
 19 See infra, Part II. 
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vessel test from whole cloth; I then discuss Justice Sotomayor’s dis-
sent, which is far more attentive to the Court’s earlier cases, and 
therefore rejects the majority’s implicit endorsement of normalizing 
admiralty. In Part IV, I outline the arguments for the normalization 
of admiralty law developed over the last twenty years by federal 
courts scholars. Finally, in Part V, I show that Lozman is best under-
stood as an exercise in the normalization of admiralty by the Court, 
and argue that Lozman demonstrates, from a practical point of view, 
many of the vices of normalizing federal admiralty law, precisely 
because it severely limits the Court’s role in shaping it. I argue that 
the Lozman case thus constitutes a pragmatic argument against any 
further implementation of a normalization strategy in federal admi-
ralty jurisprudence. 
I.  SETTING THE STAGE: VESSEL STATUS BEFORE LOZMAN 
Before approaching Lozman, it is necessary to briefly summa-
rize the state of the law on vessel status, which is often one aspect 
of determining admiralty jurisdiction, prior to the Lozman case 
reaching the Supreme Court. Section 3 of the Rules of Construction 
Act provides that “the word ‘vessel’ includes every description of 
watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being 
used, as a means of transportation on water.”20 This definition has 
been codified in federal law since 1873,21 but the Supreme Court 
and the federal circuits have long been ambivalent about whether 
the Section 3 definition is the, or even an, authoritative standard in 
determining vessel status. Before Lozman, the Supreme Court de-
cided six cases significantly addressing the issue of what constitutes 
a vessel under federal admiralty law. One of those cases, The Robert 
W. Parsons,22 which was decided thirty years after the statutory def-
inition was enacted, was regarded for decades as the leading case in 
the Court’s vessel status jurisprudence, and it does not mention Sec-
tion 3 at all. The Court’s attention to the issue has also been sporadic. 
There was an active period in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth 
century, over a span of thirty-nine years (1887–1926), during which 
                                                                                                             
 20 1 U.S.C. §3 (2012). 
 21 See Stewart, 543 U.S. at 489–90. 
 22 191 U.S. 17 (1903). 
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the Court found vessel status in four cases and offered a line of sub-
stantive reasoning justifying those conclusions.23 A fifth, relatively 
easy case (involving an ordinary barge) came in 1944.24 There was 
then a sixty-one year period in which the Court was silent on vessel 
status, though the lower courts, and especially the Fifth Circuit, de-
veloped vessel status jurisprudence considerably during that time, 
and, again, often without relying on 1 U.S.C. §3 at all.25 
The Court’s long reticence on vessel status ended with review of 
a case from the First Circuit, Stewart v Dutra Construction Co.26In 
Stewart, the plaintiff was injured while working on the Super Scoop, 
one of the largest floating dredges in the world, while digging what 
is now the Ted Williams Tunnel beneath Boston Harbor.27 The 
plaintiff subsequently filed a claim for compensation under the 
Jones Act.28 Since the Jones Act provides a cause of action for neg-
ligence for injured seamen, the Court had to determine whether the 
plaintiff was a seaman under the definition provided by the Long-
shore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, “a master or mem-
ber of a crew of any vessel.”29 That determination rested entirely on 
whether the Super Scoop was a vessel within that definition of a 
seaman. 
                                                                                                             
 23 See Cope v. Vallette Dry-Dock Co., 119 U.S. 625, 627–28 (1887) (holding 
that a floating dry-dock was not a vessel); The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. at 
33–34 (holding that a horse-drawn Erie Canal boat was a vessel); Ellis v. United 
States, 206 U.S. 246 (1907) (holding that scows and floating dredges were ves-
sels); Evansville & Bowling Green Packet Co.v. Chero Cola Bottling Co., 271 
U.S. 19 (1926) (holding that a wharfboat on the Ohio River was not a vessel). 
Among these cases, only Evansville cites 1 U.S.C. §3. 
 24 See Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U.S. 565 (1944) (holding that a barge was 
a vessel), which relied on the Section 3 definition (at 572 n.4). 
 25 See, e.g., Davis v. Cargill, Inc., 808 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1986); Atkins v. 
Greenville Shipbuilding Corporation, 411 F. 2d 279 (5th Cir. 1969); Powers v. 
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 477 F.2d 643 (1st Cir. 1973); U.S. v. Moran Towing & 
Transp. Co., 374 F.2d 656 (4th Cir. 1967); Bernardo v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 314 
F.2d 604 (2nd Cir. 1963). None of these cases rely on, or even reference, 1 U.S.C. 
§3. 
 26 Stewart, 543 U.S. 481 (2005). 
 27 Id., at 484-485. 
 28 46 U.S.C. §30104 (2006). 
 29 33 U.S.C. §902(3)(G). The Court has long taken §902(3)(G) to provide the 
statutory definition of a seaman, used to trigger coverage of the Jones Act. See 
McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 347 (1991) (“‘Master or member 
of a crew’ [§902(3)(G)] is a refinement of the term ‘seaman’ in the Jones Act.”). 
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The Court was faced with the usual task of resolving a conflict 
in the lower courts, but in this instance the conflict was unusually 
one within the Fifth Circuit. In the decades leading up to Stewart, 
Fifth Circuit panels had uniformly begun the vessel status inquiry 
with the criteria set out in The Robert W. Parsons, examining “the 
purpose for which the craft is constructed and the business in which 
it is engaged,”30 but had gone in two different directions in deter-
mining vessel status of floating structures with special purposes, 
such as spud barges, jack-up rigs, and other floating work plat-
forms.31 In one line of cases, the Fifth Circuit took something close 
to an anything-that-floats approach, finding vessel status even if the 
structure was immobilized, moored to land, and therefore not easily 
taken into navigation.32 Judge Davis summarized the approach this 
way: “Despite the outward appearance of the structure at issue, if a 
primary purpose of the craft is to transport passengers, cargo, or 
equipment from place to place across navigable waters, then that 
structure is a vessel.”33 In another line of cases, Fifth Circuit panels 
took a narrower approach. Using another one of the Supreme 
Court’s early cases, Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co., in which a float-
ing dry dock was deemed not a vessel,34 the Fifth Circuit occasion-
ally did not find vessel status if the floating structure was con-
structed and used primarily as a work platform, was moored at the 
time of the accident, and, although was capable of movement and 
                                                                                                             
 30 The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. at 30. 
 31 A useful summary of the disagreement within the Fifth Circuit preceding 
Stewart is given by Judge Davis in Manuel v. P.A.W. Drilling & Well Service, 
Inc., 135 F.3d 344, 347–351 (1998). 
 32 See Cook v. Belden Concrete Prods., 472 F.2d 999, 1001 (5th Cir. 1973) 
(Stating that “unconventional craft [such] as submersible drilling barges and float-
ing dredges which are designed for navigation and commerce are vessels within 
general maritime and Jones Act jurisdiction and retain such status even while 
moored, dry-docked, or otherwise immobilized and secured to land.”). 
 33 Manuel, 135 F.3d at 348 (citations omitted). 
 34 Cope, 119 U.S. at 627–628 (“A fixed structure, such as this dry dock is, 
not used for the purpose of navigation, is not a subject of salvage service, any 
more than is a wharf or a warehouse when projecting into or upon the water. The 
fact that it floats on the water does not make it a ship or vessel . . . A ship or vessel, 
used for navigation and commerce, though lying at a wharf and temporarily made 
fast thereto, as well as her furniture and cargo, are maritime subjects, and are ca-
pable of receiving salvage service.”). 
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sometimes did in fact move across navigable water, that transporta-
tion function was merely incidental to its primary purpose of serving 
as a work platform.35 
The Supreme Court in Stewart clearly found the Super Scoop in 
many ways an ideal occasion to resolve this decades-long conflict, 
as it was both used as a work platform but, as is typical of dredges, 
required movement across navigable water in order to discharge its 
function, and yet was stationary at the time of the plaintiff’s injury. 
The Court began its analysis by fixing the definition of “vessel” in 
1 U.S.C. §3 as the focal point of inquiry: “every description of wa-
ter-craft and other contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a 
means of transportation on water.” This definition, it held, “merely 
codified the meaning that the term ‘vessel’ had acquired in general 
maritime law”36 and “continues to supply the default definition of 
‘vessel’ throughout the U.S. Code.”37 This maneuver both signalled 
to the circuits that the statutory definition is to be the primary, 
though not the only, object of interpretation, and also streamlined its 
own interpretive task in the case. 
The Stewart Court construed “capable of being used” in the stat-
ute as meaning being practically capable of such use: “the question 
remains in all cases whether the watercraft’s use ‘as a means of 
transportation on water’ is a practical possibility or merely a theo-
retical one.”38 The primary sense of theoretical capability that de-
feats vessel status is when a structure is “permanently moored” to 
the shore.39 It further reasoned that Section 3 did not require that a 
structure be used primarily for the purpose of transportation over 
water, but only that it could be so used.40 Finally, it rejected a “snap-
shot” test of vessel status by not requiring an inquiry into whether 
the watercraft was moving at the time of an accident; however, 
“structures may lose their character as vessels if they have been 
                                                                                                             
 35 See Bernard v. Binnings Constr. Co. Inc., 741 F.2d 824, 831 (5th Cir. 
1984). 
 36 Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 490 (2005). 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 496. 
 39 Id. at 494 (“Simply put, a watercraft is not ‘capable of being used’ for mar-
itime transport in any meaningful sense if it has been permanently moored or oth-
erwise rendered practically incapable of transportation or movement.”). 
 40 Id. at 495. 
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withdrawn from the water for extended periods of time.”41 On this 
complex interpretation of Section 3, the Super Scoop clearly was a 
vessel.42 And while the Court arguably narrowed slightly the scope 
of Section 3, with the caveat of requiring practical capability of 
transportation over water, defeated only by permanent mooring, it 
nonetheless likely intended Stewart to bring relative certainty on the 
vessel status issue for the lower courts for the foreseeable future. 
But nearly immediately after Stewart was decided, a conflict be-
tween the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits arose that would lead to the 
Court granting certiorari on Lozman as an occasion to resolve it. In 
2006, the Fifth Circuit ruled in De La Rosa v. St. Charles Gaming 
Co.43 that a riverboat casino in Louisiana which was “indefinitely 
moored to the land by lines tied to steel pilings”44 for the previous 
five years, but was otherwise fully operational, was not a vessel be-
cause “the Defendants do not intend to use it as such. Rather, their 
intent is to use it solely as an indefinitely moored floating casino. Its 
operations are entirely gaming-related, and not maritime in na-
ture.”45 
Two years later, the Eleventh Circuit decided Board of Commis-
sioners of the Orleans Levee District v. M/V Belle of Orleans,46 
holding that a riverboat casino that had been indefinitely moored 
“with steel cables, received utility lines from land, and engaged in a 
business that could have physically, if not legally, been conducted 
on shore” was nonetheless a vessel for purposes of an in rem ac-
tion.47 The structure was moored on Lake Ponchartrain for four 
years, but had broken free and was damaged during Hurricane 
Katrina. The Court explicitly rejected the Fifth Circuit’s considera-
tion of the intention of the owner of the structure in De La Rosa, and 
focused only on whether the structure was practically capable of 
transportation over water. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that 
                                                                                                             
 41 Id. at 496. 
 42 Id. at 497. 
 43 474 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2006). The court quotes 1 U.S.C. §3 (Id. at 187), but 
the statute seems not to have played any significant role in its reasoning. 
 44 Id. at 187. 
 45 Id. 
 46 535 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 47 Id. at 1307. 
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The owner’s intentions with regard to a boat are anal-
ogous to the boat’s ‘purpose,’ and Stewart clearly re-
jected any definition of ‘vessel’ that relies on such a 
purpose. . . Under . . . De La Rosa, a boat may enter 
and leave admiralty jurisdiction on the basis of state 
law and the individual thoughts of the boat owner as 
to what use of the boat is most desirable . . . Such a 
result is clearly not what the Supreme Court in-
tended.48 
The Eleventh Circuit determined that the Belle of Orleans was a ves-
sel for admiralty jurisdiction purposes, because it was practically ca-
pable of transportation or movement, as it was still functionally op-
erational and could move under its own power.49 
This conflict therefore set the stage for the Supreme Court to 
grant certiorari on a case which would provide an opportunity to 
settle several issues that arose subsequent to Stewart: (1) to address 
the relevance of the intention of the owner in regards to the purpose 
of the floating structure, (2) to establish some way to determine 
whether a floating structure was “indefinitely” or “permanently” 
moored, and (3) to comment on the relevance of these facts for de-
termining practical capability. The next case would also give the 
Court a chance to clarify (4) the substantive relationship between 1 
U.S.C. §3 and the 150 years of its own precedent on vessel status, 
especially given the fact that the lower courts (especially the Fifth 
Circuit) have historically been inclined to rely only on the cases, and 
ignore the statutory definition, at least as often as they have looked 
to the statute alongside the cases for guidance.50 
                                                                                                             
 48 Id. at 1311. 
 49 Id. at 1312. The Eleventh Circuit’s panel discussion in Lozman included 
the Seventh Circuit as also part of the inter-circuit conflict. See City of Riviera 
Beach v. That Certain Unnamed Gray, 649 F. 3d 1259, 1267 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(citing Tagliere v. Harrah’s Ill. Corp., 445 F.3d 1012, 1016 (7th Cir. 2006)), which 
held that a riverboat casino was a vessel for purposes of admiralty tort jurisdiction, 
though stationary for the previous two years, but left opened the possibility, for 
exploration on remand, that it may be deemed “permanently moored” if its owner 
intends that it will never sail again. 
 50 See the cases cited supra note 25. 
2017] LOST AT SEA 951 
 
II.  LOZMAN: CERTIORARI, ORAL ARGUMENT, AND HAVING FUN 
In Lozman, decided only eight years after Stewart, the Court 
achieved none of these things. It introduced a test for vessel status 
which does not obviously provide an answer to any of these ques-
tions. In fact, the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
Court’s review of Lozman, from the granting of certiorari, to oral 
argument and the published opinion, and even after the case was 
decided when Chief Justice Roberts made some rare and revealing 
public comments about the Court’s posture towards the case, sug-
gests an unusual degree of levity and carelessness in the Court’s 
handling of the substantive issues. This levity and carelessness, I 
will suggest, was a compliment to, and reinforcement of, the Court’s 
implicit acceptance of a strategy, in reviewing the case, to “normal-
ize” admiralty law alongside other areas of federal law.51 
A. The Granting of Certiorari 
In the Petition for Certiorari, the Petitioner Lozman provided the 
Court with standard grounds for granting certiorari on the Eleventh 
Circuit case: evidence of an inter-circuit conflict.52 The conflict was 
clear enough,53 though the fact that such a conflict exists is hardly a 
sufficient, and commonly not even a necessary, condition for the 
Supreme Court to grant certiorari on a case.54 The Court’s actual 
                                                                                                             
 51 See infra Part IV. 
 52 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Lozman (No. 11-626), 2011 WL 
5834670 (quoting City of Riviera Beach, 649 F.3d at 1267): 
[T]he Eleventh Circuit openly acknowledged that the Fifth and 
Seventh Circuits have adopted different tests for determining 
whether a stricture is a “vessel,” “both of which focus on the 
intent of the shipowner rather than” the structure’s potential 
ability to move or be towed across water. . . But, the Eleventh 
Circuit explained that in Belle of Orleans it had squarely “re-
jected the reasoning of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits.” 
 53 See supra notes 43–49 and accompanying text. 
 54 See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, Setting the Social 
Agenda: Deciding to Review High-Profile Cases at the Supreme Court, 57 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 313, 316–24 (discussing the various factors that figure into Supreme 
Court Justices’ voting to grant certiorari on a case.) See also Margaret Meriwether 
Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: Jurisprudential Con-
siderations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 389, 441–49 
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reasons for ultimately granting certiorari in particular cases are 
never made public, and given that its choices in granting certiorari 
are completely unconstrained by Court procedure or substantive fed-
eral law, they often reflect the idiosyncratic preferences of the Jus-
tices.55 
Those preferences in the Lozman case are not immediately clear, 
but from the perspective of the long history of the Supreme Court’s 
vessel status cases, as well as the general purposes of federal admi-
ralty law, there were strong reasons ex ante for the Court to decline 
certiorari on Lozman. First, the floating structure at issue in the case 
was never an instrument of maritime commerce56—a significant 
fact, given that one of the fundamental purposes of the original con-
stitutional grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to the federal 
courts is the protection and facilitation of maritime commerce.57 The 
Petitioner Lozman’s floating structure did not participate in, or sig-
nificantly affect, maritime commerce for the entirety of the period 
in which he owned it. Lozman’s long-running disputes with the city 
                                                                                                             
(discussing the divergent views of Supreme Court Justices regarding the relative 
importance of resolving conflicts among the circuits.). 
 55 See Cordray & Cordray, Setting the Social Agenda, supra note 54, at 318 
(quoting Eugene Gressman, The National Court of Appeals: A Dissent, 59 A.B.A. 
J. 253, 255 (1973)) (“With this unfettered discretion, the Justices are free to select 
cases on any basis, constrained ‘solely by their individual notions of what is im-
portant or appropriate for review by the Court.’”). 
 56 Though it was used in maritime commerce in the incidental and trivial 
sense that it was towed several times around the Florida coast. See Lozman, 133 
S. Ct. at 739. 
 57 See Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 15 (2004) (quot-
ing Exxon Corp. v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc., 500 U.S. 603, 608 (1991)) (“The 
fundamental interest giving rise to maritime jurisdiction is ‘the protection of mar-
itime commerce.’”) The Supreme Court has in fact considered six cases involving 
non-commercial floating structures; two of the most significant are Foremost In-
surance Co. V. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 (1982) (holding that a collision between 
two small pleasure boats in a Louisiana river was within admiralty tort jurisdic-
tion), and Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S. A. v. Calhoun (holding that there was fed-
eral admiralty jurisdiction over a harbor crash between a jet ski and a ship). These 
have, however, been met with substantial scholarly criticism. See, e.g., David W. 
Robertson, Summertime Sailing and the U.S. Supreme Court: The Need for a Na-
tional Admiralty Court, 29 J. MAR. L. & COM. 275, 279 (1998) (noting that “to 
knowledgeable observers, the two decisions in combination are ridiculous, and 
they have left the lower courts confronting a ridiculous array of once-manageable 
questions.”). 
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of Riviera Beach, which the lower courts discussed primarily as a 
set of landlord-tenant issues,58 and their potential resolution by the 
Court, did not obviously bear any connection to the most general 
purposes of federal admiralty law.59 Second, the res in question was 
arguably sui generis, a custom-made “floating shack, built out of 
plywood with only 1/16” of fiberglass surrounding its unraked hull, 
without proper cleats for towing, no bilge pumps, no navigation 
aids, no lifeboats and other lifesaving equipment, no propulsion, 
[and] no steering,”60 and so not appreciably similar to any floating 
structure that might be used in maritime commerce.61 It was thus far 
from clear ex ante what value any analysis by the Court regarding 
the vessel status of this structure would have for the lower courts, to 
owners of borderline cases of vessels such as floating casinos, to 
insurers of those structures, and many others, in deciding whether a 
particular craft was a vessel and thus potentially subject to the ad-
miralty jurisdiction of the federal courts. 
B. The Myth of Lozman as an Unimportant Case 
It may be thought—and the Court may have been lead to think 
in granting certiorari—that Lozman was a case which essentially 
hinged on merely a definitional question of the meaning of the word 
“vessel” in the U.S. Code, and therefore that the case is a minor, 
technical one which does not merit much attention. This was at least 
one general scholarly assessment offered after the case was decided. 
                                                                                                             
 58 See City of Riviera Beach, 648 F.3d at 1263, where the Eleventh Circuit 
discusses the City’s “notice of eviction” issued to Lozman, and that in prior evic-
tion proceedings in state court, the City argued that the dockage agreement “es-
tablished a nonresidential tenancy under Florida Law.” 
 59 See infra, pp. 27–28. 
 60 This is the descriptive gloss given of Lozman’s floating structure in the 
Eleventh Circuit’s opinion. See City of Riviera Beach, 649 F. 3d at 1269. The 
court further described the structure as “unusual,” (Id.) “unorthodox,” (Id.) and an 
“unusually designed craft” (Id.). Justice Sotomayor later pointed out in her dis-
sent, Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 753, that “a surveyor was unable to find any compa-
rable craft for sale in the State of Florida.” 
 61 See Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 
527, 533 (1995) (citing Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 (1982)) 
(“We conceded that pleasure boats themselves have little to do with the maritime 
commerce lying at the heart of the admiralty court’s basic work[.]”). 
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“In many respects Lozman seems to those of us who are not admi-
ralty specialists like a small case[.]”62 Remarkably, even some ad-
miralty specialists do not view the vessel status issue as particularly 
significant in general, and would presumably, by extension, not 
view Lozman as significant either.63 
What is more alarming, however, is that the Chief Justice of the 
United States also seems to have shared this assessment, during and 
after the Court’s review of the case. In an interview at the Fourth 
Circuit Judicial Conference following the Supreme Court’s 2012–
2013 term, Chief Justice John Roberts made some unusually exten-
sive, extra-judicial remarks about the Lozman case. He was asked 
whether there were any cases from the past term which were note-
worthy but had not received much media attention. Here is his re-
sponse (I emphasize in bold the most important passages): 
I think if you look at the cases we have out of sev-
enty-seven – what, there are maybe a half dozen that 
people are going to be talking about at the panel dis-
cussions and things like that – but some of the others 
are, the littler ones can be very fascinating. I think 
my favorite from the past term was a case called 
Lozman, which involved the question of, in admi-
ralty jurisdiction, over what counts as a vessel. And 
                                                                                                             
 62 Frederick Schauer, Analogy in the Supreme Court: Lozman v City of Rivi-
era Beach, Florida, 2013 Sup. Ct. Rev. 405, 410 (2013); See also Id. at 431–32 
(“Lozman is not an important case. It may not even be an important admiralty 
case.”). 
 63 See Schoenbaum, supra note 2, at 37 (“Fortunately in the overwhelming 
majority of cases, the problem of defining a vessel does not arise because the craft 
fits the common sense notion of the term as a structure built to transport goods 
and passengers over water.”); Grant Gilmore & Charles L. Black, Jr., The Law of 
Admiralty 33 (2d ed. 1975) (stating that vessel status arises in litigation “once in 
a while” and is not “of great importance.”) David Robertson and Michael Sturley 
call these remarks “inexplicable” (David W. Robertson and Michael F. Sturley, 
Vessel Status in Maritime Law: Does Lozman set a New Course?, 44 J. MAR. L. 
& COM. 393, 395 n.14 (2013)), but the context for the remarks in each treatise 
make clear that these scholars think that the vessel issue, while obviously im-
portant, is insignificant in the sense that it is not frequently a subject of litigation 
given a broad consensus across both the admiralty bench and bar about what con-
stitutes a vessel in wide range of legal contexts. Of course, these remarks were 
made before Lozman was decided, and whether the case has disturbed that broad 
consensus remains to be seen. 
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the law has a very broad definition of what a vessel 
is. And the way cases develop in the law, of course 
you have something that seems to fit not comfortably 
into either category. It was, depending on what side 
you were on, it was either a floating home or a house-
boat. [Audience laughter.] And it was a residence 
that was attached to the shore more or less perma-
nently, but which could be disengaged and would 
float and could be towed around. Again, the issue 
was whether it counted as a vessel or not. It was one 
of those cases where a picture’s worth a thousand 
words. If you look at the picture of the thing on the 
water it very much looks like a house that got swept 
into the ocean somehow, rather than a boat that’s un-
derway, and that – the Court did hold that it was not 
a vessel. But we had a lot of fun with it, looking at 
the different characteristics, and posing a lot of inter-
esting hypotheticals at the argument.64 
Several aspects of these rare public comments by the Chief Jus-
tice are noteworthy. First, it is abundantly clear that Chief Justice 
Roberts’ general approach to the case, consistent with the major-
ity’s, was that it was fundamentally about fitting Lozman’s floating 
structure in one category (“vessel”) or another (“not a vessel”) by 
applying the “very broad” definition of “vessel” in 1 U.S.C. §3. This 
is likely the sort of thing Justice Kennedy referred to during oral 
argument of Lozman as “the law school game,”65 i.e., of developing 
the boundaries of application of a definition by assaying a range of 
both intuitive and counter-intuitive cases. Second, in his associating 
the idea of “a picture’s worth a thousand words” with the Court’s 
reasoning and outcome of the case, Chief Justice Roberts echoes the 
majority’s emphasis on what Justice Sotomayor repeatedly calls in 
                                                                                                             
 64 See Chief Justice John Roberts Remarks, Fourth Circuit Judicial Confer-
ence, June 29, 2013: https://www.c-span.org/video/?313594-2/chief-justice-john-
roberts-remarks (my emphasis). 
 65 Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Lozman v. The City of Riviera Beach, 
Florida, 133 U.S. 735 (2013) (No 11-626) (Oct. 1, 2012) [hereinafter Transcript]. 
See infra, Part II.C. 
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her dissent mere “esthetic features,”66 features which are, and al-
ways have been, irrelevant in determining vessel status. Third, the 
Chief Justice’s general disposition towards the case appears to be 
one of amusement. He describes Lozman as one of the Court’s “lit-
tler” cases of the term, though the sense in which he believes Loz-
man is a “little” case is not clear. The context of this remark within 
his full response suggests that he thinks it is a “little” case precisely 
because it required, in his view, merely entertaining far-fetched ex-
amples of possible vessels, and studying pictures of both Lozman’s 
floating home and of other vessels and non-vessels, and then making 
a determination on those bases. This seems to be the explanation for 
why the Court “had a lot of fun with it.” 
The suggestions that the issue of what is and is not a vessel under 
federal admiralty law is relatively insignificant, and that a case hing-
ing on that issue is likewise unimportant, are on their face absurd. 
But the fact that this was suggested by the Chief Justice of the Su-
preme Court of the United States is even more troubling. Even those 
who are not admiralty specialists can surmise that a vessel status 
determination may trigger the applicability of a large body of federal 
law, the consequences of which may be significant, indeed, dispos-
itive.67 The most obvious example is the distinctive admiralty in rem 
action, which by definition can be taken only against vessels.68 
Moreover, the applicability of a significant number of federal stat-
utes also depends on the determination of vessel status, including 
                                                                                                             
 66 Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 752 and 753 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 67 It is also notable in this context that Chief Justice Roberts, while not per-
haps a specialist in admiralty, has some experience in the area, and with questions 
of admiralty jurisdiction in particular. Nearly twenty years before Lozman, and 
well before the beginning of his tenure as Chief Justice, he represented Great 
Lakes Dredge and Dock Company in an important admiralty jurisdiction case be-
fore the Supreme Court. Grubart, 513 U.S. at 529. His arguments were ultimately 
persuasive. See Joseph Blocher, Roberts’ Rules: The Assertiveness of Rules-Based 
Jurisprudence, 46 Tulsa L. Rev. 431, 431–432 (2011) (discussing Chief Justice 
Roberts’ arguments as counsel in Grubart and his reliance on the Court’s ac-
ceptance of them in his later briefs as counsel in the Supreme Court). 
 68 See The Rock Island Bridge, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 213, 216 (1867) (holding 
that admiralty in rem actions can be brought only against vessels), later codified 
in the Supplemental Admiralty and Maritime Claims Rule C(1), 28 U.S.C.A. 
(2016) (authorizing an action in rem “to enforce any maritime lien” or “whenever 
a statute of the United States provides for a maritime action in rem of a proceeding 
analogous thereto.”). 
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the Maritime Lien Act,69 the Oil Pollution Act,70 the Ship Mortgage 
Act,71 the Admiralty Extension Act,72 and many others.73 
But more generally, the claim that a case which defines the very 
subject matter of a well-entrenched and vast area of federal law—
that is, a case which defines the very entities which that area of law 
explicitly governs—is somehow an “unimportant” or “little” case 
can hardly be sustained. It should be obvious, for example, that the 
cases which determine the definition (and therefore, the core set) of 
objects of other areas of federal regulation are not trivial or “little.” 
It has never been suggested that cases which answer such questions 
as “what is a security?,”74 “what is a seizure?,”75 “what is a supervi-
sor?,”76 “what is a major life activity?,”77 and countless others, are 
minor cases of little consequence. A Supreme Court case in admi-
ralty setting out the generally applicable definition of the primary 
maritime object of federal regulation is not relevantly different from 
these cases, cases which are generally regarded as of fundamental 
importance to whole bodies of federal regulation. 
                                                                                                             
 69 46 U.S. §31341 (granting a maritime lien to a one who provides “neces-
saries to a vessel”), the statute which was the basis of the federal litigation in 
Lozman. 
 70 33 U.S.C.A. §§2701–2761 (regulating the discharge of oil by vessels on 
navigable waters). 
 71 46 U.S.C. §31322 (giving priority to certain mortgages covering “the 
whole of the vessel.”). 
 72 46 U.S.C. §30101 (extending admiralty jurisdiction to “cases of injury or 
damage, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable waters.”). 
 73 See David Robertson, Border Wars: Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach,11 
BENEDICT’S MAR. BULL. 18 (2013) (discussing the various contexts in federal law 
in which vessel status is important). 
 74 See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990) (defining “security” under 
the Securities Act of 1933 §2(1), 15 U.S.C. §77b(1) (2016)). 
 75 See Michigan v. Chestnut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988) (defining “seizure” under 
the Fourth Amendment). 
 76 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) and Burlington 
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (defining “supervisor” for purposes 
of determining employers’ vicarious liability for the unlawful actions of supervi-
sory employees in Title VII hostile environment sexual harassment cases). 
 77 See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (defining “major life activity” 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act). 
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C. Oral Argument and Having Fun 
Chief Justice Roberts’s extra-judicial comments that, in Lozman, 
the Court “had a lot of fun” with one of its “littler cases” indicate 
that the Court may have reviewed the case with an unusual degree 
of levity. This is further supported by certain aspects of how oral 
argument in the case proceeded, in which the Justices demonstrated 
a consistently unhelpful methodological approach to resolving the 
vessel status issue, and thereby revealed a shared sense that this was 
an insignificant case. 
First, it was clear throughout the oral argument of Lozman that 
a majority of the Court were of the view that the case was to be 
resolved merely by an exercise in statutory interpretation, specifi-
cally by engaging in the narrow task of interpreting the word “ves-
sel” in 1 U.S.C. §3, completely independently of the Court’s prior 
vessel status cases. Almost immediately, Chief Justice Roberts indi-
cated this. When Jeffrey Fisher, counsel for Lozman, began by ar-
guing for a purpose-based test rooted in Evansville78 and other cases, 
the Chief Justice responded: “Well, that just has—I understand the 
argument. It’s got no connection whatever to the statutory language, 
right? . . . Capable is in the statute, purpose is not, right?”79 Similar 
concerns about how only Section 3 applies, without any reference to 
earlier cases, were expressed by Justice Alito,80 Justice Kagan,81 
                                                                                                             
 78 Evansville, 271 U.S. at 22 (the wharfboat “performed no function that 
might not have been performed as well by an appropriate structure on the land and 
by a floating stage or platform permanently attached to the land.”). 
 79 Transcript at 5 (statement of Chief Justice Roberts). 
 80 See Transcript at 11 (statement of Justice Alito) (“I just don’t see how you 
can get purpose into this statutory language”); Transcript at 14 (statement of Jus-
tice Alito) (“I don’t see how they get—how you get [purpose or indefinite moor-
ing] into the words of the statute.”). 
 81 See Transcript at 40 (statement of Justice Kagan) (“You’re reading the stat-
ute – you’re reading the statute as if it says something can be transported over 
water. But the statute doesn’t say that. It says something can be used or capable 
of being used as a means of transportation on water. So that – that the question is 
whether this thing is transporting other things over water, and whether that’s its 
function; and in my hypothetical it’s not its function. Its function is to serve as a 
house. That house happens to be on water, but it’s just a house.”). 
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Justice Kennedy,82 and Justice Scalia.83 There was even some mild 
hostility expressed by the Court towards its own vessel cases. While 
Fisher was arguing for a test based on function or purpose—he used 
the terms interchangeably—Justice Kagan interjected: “Well, then 
you’re not talking about purpose; you’re talking about function, 
right? You’re just using purpose as a kind of strange synonym for 
function.”84 The strangeness of Fisher’s alleged equivocation she at-
tributed to the Court’s line of vessel status cases: “So you are really 
talking about a function test. And you are using strange words, be-
cause they come out of our opinions—kind of not your fault.”85 
Second, perhaps because the Court considered its role in the case 
as developing a workable interpretation of the word “vessel” under 
the statutory definition, and nothing more, it employed a method of 
interpretation which seemed naturally suited to the task. The method 
can be characterized as a species of reductio ad absurdum: start with 
a tentative definition proposed by counsel, then imagine some con-
ceptually possible scenario which involves an object which would 
notionally fall under the proposed definition. If it does, and that ap-
plication of the definition is intuitively objectionable, then the defi-
nition should be discarded and another one considered which does 
not extend to the imagined objectionable scenario; the new defini-
tion is then subjected to the same scrutiny by example and counter-
example. 
The rigorous application of this method by the Court had a par-
ticular effect on the course of oral argument: it devolved at times 
into the Justices suggesting a series of absurd, and seemingly irrele-
vant, putative counter-examples to various interpretations of 1 
U.S.C. §3. David Frederick, counsel for Riviera Beach, who argued 
for something approaching an “anything-that-floats” test,86 had to 
                                                                                                             
 82 See Transcript at 43 (statement of Justice Kennedy) (“Does it carry goods 
under the statute[?]”). 
 83 See Transcript at 12 (statement of Justice Scalia) (“Can I ask about that 
definition? That definition comes from the Rules of Construction Act, right . . . 
which provides the meaning of all – of the word vessel as used in the United States 
Code. Okay?”). 
 84 Transcript at 11 (statement of Justice Kagan). 
 85 Id. at 14 (statement of Justice Kagan) (my emphasis). 
 86 Id. at 31 (statement of David Frederick, Counsel for City of Riviera Beach, 
Florida) (“Our position is that the houseboat is a vessel under section 3 because it 
floats, moves, and carries people or things on water[.]”). 
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consider a total of ten such presumed counterexamples from the 
Court: an inner tube,87 cup,88 garage door,89 an inner tube with pen-
nies pasted on it,90 a Styrofoam sofa,91 a Styrofoam sofa carrying a 
coffee can,92 a floating sofa carrying a cushion,93 a floating adver-
tising sign,94 a trampoline,95 a “kind of a log next to a beach some-
where,”96 and a Polynesian boat in a museum.97 Justice Breyer, who 
would later author the majority opinion, offered seven of the ten hy-
potheticals. With each example, the clearly intended purpose of in-
troducing it was to suggest that the broad definition under consider-
ation is overbroad, inappropriate, or otherwise unacceptable, be-
cause it encompassed the counter-intuitive example of a (possible) 
vessel. 
Early in the proceedings, Justice Kennedy explained this style of 
questioning by remarking to Lozman’s counsel, Jeffrey Fisher, “you 
know the law school game.”98 Later Justice Kennedy suggested that 
the Court was in search of a “universal definition”‘of what a floating 
home is or is not, which would assist in deciding the case.99 As 
something like the statement of a methodology, this smacks of the 
old, a priori method of philosophical investigation made famous by 
Socrates as depicted in the dialogues of Plato from the fifth century 
BCE.100 While this method of inquiry has a venerable history in phi-
losophy and other disciplines, its relevance for answering questions 
of fundamental importance about federal law is not obvious. 
Riviera Beach’s counsel, David Frederick, understandably 
seemed perplexed and even annoyed by the Court’s employment of 
                                                                                                             
 87 Id. at 31–32 (statement of Chief Justice Roberts). 
 88 Id. at 32 (statement of Justice Breyer). 
 89 Id. (statement of Justice Sotomayor). 
 90 Id. (statement of Justice Kagan). 
 91 Id. at 36 (statement of Justice Breyer). 
 92 Id. at 37 (statement of Justice Breyer). 
 93 Id. at 39 (statement of Justice Breyer). 
 94 Id. at 44 (statement of Justice Breyer). 
 95 Id. at 46 (statement of Justice Sotomayor). 
 96 Id. at 51 (statement of Justice Breyer). 
 97 Id. at 24 (statement of Justice Breyer). 
 98 Id. at 8 (statement of Justice Kennedy). 
 99 Id. at 17 (statement of Justice Kennedy). 
 100 See Gregory Vlastos, The Socratic Elenchus, 1 OXFORD STUD. OF ANCIENT 
PHIL. 27 (1983) (discussing the method of argument and refutation employed by 
Socrates in Plato’s early dialogues). 
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this method and the repeated proposal of many practically irrelevant 
and ridiculous examples. While respectfully attempting to respond 
to each, he twice offered a pragmatic rebuttal to the esoteric line of 
questioning. In response to Justice Kagan’s pennies-on-the-inner-
tube hypothetical, Frederick responded: “Justice Kagan, I—I think 
we could imagine all kinds of de minimis types of hypotheticals that 
would satisfy the basic criteria. But what the Court in Stewart said 
was practical capability as viewed in a real world sense.”101 And, 
again, in response to Justice Breyer’s floating-sofa-carrying-a-cush-
ion example: “I think I’ve given up the absurd hypos because there 
[is] no litigation on them.”102 These are surely the correct responses 
to this absurd and inexplicable line of questioning by the Court. 
III.  LOZMAN V. THE CITY OF RIVIERA BEACH, FLORIDA 
The substance of the Court’s 7-2 opinion in Lozman reflects the 
same general trajectory of concern and argument which it demon-
strated during oral argument, particularly with respect to the follow-
ing three assumptions: (1) that providing an interpretation of 1 
U.S.C. §3 was the only task before them in the case,103 (2) that an 
interpretation of 1 U.S.C. §3 should be arrived at primarily by re-
flecting on various imaginary examples of possible vessels, however 
absurd, in order to test the soundness of their interpretation, and that 
(3) the prior Supreme Court cases and those in the Circuits address-
ing vessel status are in themselves of little or no relevance in carry-
ing out this task. 
A. The Majority’s Opinion 
Justice Breyer wrote for the 7-2 majority.104 The Court began by 
not just limiting its starting point to determining the meaning of 1 
                                                                                                             
 101 Id. at 33 (statement of David C. Frederick, Counsel for City of Riviera 
Beach, Florida) (emphasis added). 
 102 Id. at 39 (statement of David C. Frederick, Counsel for City of Riviera 
Beach, Florida) (emphasis added). 
 103 Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 739. See also Robertson and Sturley, supra note 63, 
at 445 (“The majority began by recognizing that it was deciding a statutory con-
struction case.”). 
 104 Lozman was only the second majority opinion in admiralty jurisdiction he 
has authored while a Justice of the Supreme Court. The other was Saratoga Fish-
ing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875 (1997) (holding that an admiralty 
tort plaintiff cannot recover for physical damage a defective product causes to the 
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U.S.C. §3, but characterized the locus of interpretation even nar-
rower, by focusing “primarily upon the statutory phrase ‘capable of 
being used . . . as a means of transportation on water.’”105 It imme-
diately disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation as “too 
broad,” which lead to the conclusion that Lozman’s floating struc-
ture was a vessel merely because it could float, could proceed under 
tow, and its shore connections did not render it “practically incapa-
ble of transportation or movement.”106 The Court continued its fix-
ation, carried on from oral argument,107 in contemplating absurd 
counterexamples to demonstrate the inadequacy of the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s interpretation of the statute. That interpretation was incorrect, 
the Court said, because it would also confer vessel status on “a 
wooden washtub, a plastic dishpan, a swimming platform on pon-
toons, a large fishing net, a door taken off its hinges, or Pinocchio 
(when inside the whale).”108 To avoid these prima facie absurd con-
sequences, the Court stated that it must “apply this definition in a 
‘practical,’ not a ‘theoretical,’ way.”109 The Court here cites Stewart 
                                                                                                             
product itself, but for damage the product causes to other property.) Lozman was 
the seventh admiralty opinion Justice Breyer had authored in his (up to that time) 
thirty-three year career as a federal judge. As a judge on the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals (1980–1994), he authored five opinions in admiralty. All upheld the judg-
ments of the lower district court, and ranged from two and a half to seven pages 
in length. See Jordan v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 738 F.2d 48 (1st Cir. 1984) (affirming 
judgment of the district court in favor of defendant against an unseaworthiness 
claim); Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50 (1st Cir. 1985) (af-
firming judgment of the district court in favor of defendant against a claim of pure 
economic loss caused by oil spill); Cerqueira v. Cerqueria, 828 F.2d 863 (1st Cir. 
1987) (affirming judgment of the district court in favour of defendant against 
claim for damages based on unseaworthiness, the Jones Act, and maintenance and 
cure); Lyon v. Ranger III, 858 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1988) (affirming judgment of the 
district court in admiralty allocating fault according to comparative negligence 
principles of Massachusetts law in a wrongful death action under general maritime 
law); Butler v. American Trawler Co., Inc., 887 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1989) (affirming 
the district court’s finding of admiralty tort jurisdiction). 
 105 Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 739. 
 106 Id. at 740 (quoting Riviera Beach v. That Certain Unnamed Gray, Two-
Story Vessel Approximately Fifty-Seven Feet in Length, 649 F.3d 1259, 1266 
(2011)). 
 107 See supra, Part II. 
 108 Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 740. 
 109 Id. at 741 (quoting Stewart, 543 U.S. at 496). 
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for support of this constraint, but in fact this use of the practical/the-
oretical distinction is altogether different than the one at work in 
Stewart, where the Court stated: “The question remains in all cases 
whether the watercraft’s use ‘as a means of transportation on water’ 
is a practical possibility or merely a theoretical one.”110 In Stewart, 
the practicality was in reference to the possibility of a craft being 
used as a means of water transport. In Lozman, the practicality now 
qualifies the application of the Section 3 definition as a whole. 
Whereas in Stewart the Court aimed to interpret Section 3 as apply-
ing to watercraft in which its use as a means of transportation over 
water was a practical, that is, a real possibility and not merely a con-
ceptually possible one, the Court in Lozman is seeking a definition 
that can be “practically,” that is, sensibly or pragmatically, applied 
across a given range of cases. This equivocation on “practical,” 
which allows a creative appropriation of Stewart, is a further indi-
cation of the Lozman Court’s narrowing of the substantive legal is-
sue even further to one of only statutory construction, rather than 
attempting, as the Stewart Court does, a holistic and coherent ap-
proach which aims to make the Section 3 interpretation consistent 
with and intelligible in terms of the long line of Supreme Court ves-
sel cases stretching back to the late nineteenth century. 
With this brief introduction in Lozman, the majority proceeds by 
setting out the following new test for vessel status under Section 3: 
[A] structure does not fall within the scope of this 
statutory phrase unless a reasonable observer, look-
ing to the [structure’s] physical characteristics and 
activities, would consider it designed to a practical 
degree for carrying people or things over water.111 
                                                                                                             
 110 Stewart, 543 U.S. at 496. 
 111 Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 741. The Court later suggests that this test “should 
offer guidance in a significant number of borderline cases where ‘capacity’ to 
transport over water is in doubt.” Id. at 745. But there is no indication in the for-
mulation of the reasonable observer test, nor elsewhere, that the Court intends for 
it to be applied only in borderline cases, but rather that it is set forth as a general 
test for vessel status, which will be of particular guidance in borderline cases. That 
the general test will offer guidance in borderline cases is merely a foreseeable 
(and, in the Court’s view, desirable) consequence of its promulgation. See gener-
ally id. at 741. 
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As Justice Sotomayor notes, correctly, in her dissent,112 this test 
not only has no basis in any vessel status case the Court, or even any 
of the circuits, have ever decided; it has no basis in any admiralty 
case in the history of the Court or the circuits.113 Besides its lack of 
basis in the Court’s precedent, the test has the additional prima facie 
weakness that it makes use of what some legal scholars have called 
an “extravagantly vague” term—here the notion of a reasonable ob-
server—which inherently admits of such broad application that it 
runs the risk of incoherence and consequently failing to guide be-
haviour.114 It is no surprise then that the remainder of the Court’s 
                                                                                                             
 112 Id. at 748, 751 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). See also, infra, Part III.B. 
 113 The only appearance of a “reasonable observer” test in the history of Su-
preme Court jurisprudence has been in a line of Establishment Clause cases, ob-
viously a context far removed from the concerns of admiralty law. See, e.g., Wit-
ters v. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 493 (1986) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“No reasonable observer is likely to draw from the facts before us an 
inference that the State itself is endorsing a religious practice or belief.”); Cty. of 
Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 620 (1989) 
(“While an adjudication of the display’s effect must take into account the perspec-
tive of one who is neither Christian nor Jewish . . . the constitutionality of its effect 
must also be judged according the standard of a ‘reasonable observer.’”); Capitol 
Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 777 (1995) (“[W]hen 
the reasonable observer would view a government practice as endorsing religion, 
I believe that it is our duty to hold the practice invalid.”) (emphasis in original); 
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 707 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Viewed 
on its face, Texas’ display . . . does [not] provide the reasonable observer with any 
basis to guess that it was erected to honor any individual or organization.”). The 
Court’s reasonable observer test in the Establishment Clause context has been met 
with sharp scholarly criticism and has been difficult to implement in the lower 
courts. See B. Jessie Hill, Anatomy of the Reasonable Observer, 79 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1407, 1413–18 (2014) (discussing the problems with the reasonable ob-
server test in Establishment Clause cases); Susan Hanley Kosse, A Missed Oppor-
tunity to Abandon the Reasonable Observer Framework in Sacred Text Cases: 
McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky and Van Orden v. Perry, 4 FIRST AMEND. 
L. REV. 139, 149 (2006) (same); Benjamin I. Sachs, Whose Reasonableness 
Counts?, 107 YALE L.J. 1523, 1524–25 (1998) (same). 
 114 See Timothy Endicott, The Value of Vagueness, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 14, 18 (Andrei Marmor & Scott 
Soames, eds., 2011). 
When law-makers use vague language in framing standards, 
they typically use extravagantly vague language such as ‘ne-
glected’ or ‘abandoned’ or ‘reasonable’. The resulting vague-
ness in the law can generate serious and deep disputes over the 
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discussion is taken up with attempting to coherently carve out a set 
of features which ought to be taken as relevant to the reasonable 
observer, and the presence of which in a structure will therefore 
ground a determination of vessel status. 
The features of Lozman’s floating structure which the Court 
found relevant to finding that it was not a vessel included that it had 
“no rudder or other steering mechanism[,]”115 “[i]ts hull was un-
raked,”116 that “it had a rectangular bottom 10 inches below the wa-
ter[,]”117 it had “no special capacity to generate or store electricity” 
and had to receive electricity via connections to land,118 its rooms 
“looked like ordinary nonmaritime living quarters[,]”119 and from 
within, a person looked out from those quarters “not through water-
tight portholes, but through French doors or ordinary windows.”120 
Moreover, while not dispositive, the structure “lack[ed] self-propul-
sion” and was towed “on only four occasions over a period of seven 
years.”121 These features suggest that the structure was not “de-
sign[ed] to transport over water anything other than its own furnish-
ings and related personal effects.”122 
Despite the fact that the “reasonable observer” test and its appli-
cation to the res in Lozman were both unprecedented, the Court 
nonetheless asserted that its interpretation of Section 3 “is consistent 
with its text, precedent, and relevant purposes.”123 The Court’s lan-
guage here is not entirely clear, especially when reading the Court’s 
                                                                                                             
principles of the standard in question. Because it may allow dif-
ferent, incompatible views as to the nature of the standard and 
the principles of its application (even among sincere and com-
petent interpreters), it leads to the danger that its application 
will be incoherent. By that I mean that decision made in pur-
ported application of the norm will not be intelligible as the ap-
plication of a single norm—a standard that can regulate behav-
iour. Id. 
 115 Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 741. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. (citing The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17, 31 (1903)). 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
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previous Section 3 interpretation. At first glance, the pronoun refer-
ring to the statute (“its”) ranges over all three considerations, such 
that the Court’s claim is that its interpretation of Section 3 is con-
sistent with the text of Section 3, only the precedent applying Sec-
tion 3, and the relevant purposes of Section 3. But what the court 
seems to have meant is that their interpretation is consistent with its 
text, the “bulk of”124 its vessel status precedent (regardless of 
whether that precedent interpreted Section 3),125 and “the purposes 
of major federal maritime statutes,” rather than only with the pur-
pose of Section 3.126 In regards to the text of Section 3, the Court 
maintained that its interpretation was consistent with it, even given 
its broad language of referring to “every description of watercraft or 
other artificial contrivance.”127 
To support its contention that the “reasonable observer” inter-
pretation of Section 3 is consistent with “the bulk of precedent,” the 
Court considers only three of its six previous cases regarding vessel 
status.128 The Court suggests that its finding that Lozman’s floating 
structure is not a vessel is consistent with Evansville, in which the 
Court held that a wharfboat was not a vessel, even though, similar 
to the structure in Lozman, “[it] floated next to a dock,” was used 
“to transfer cargo from ship to dock and ship to ship,” was connected 
to the dock by cables, utility lines, and a ramp, and not only was 
capable of being towed, but was towed annually.129 Additionally, 
the Court cites Stewart as consistent with its conclusions, since the 
dredge in Stewart had, but the structure in Lozman lacked, “a captain 
and crew, navigational lights, ballast tanks, and a crew dining 
area.”130 Finally, the Court compares its determinations in Cope, 
                                                                                                             
 124 Id. at 742. 
 125 For example, the Court considers The Robert W. Parsons, Cope, and 
Grubart, none of which even mention the Section 3 definition of “vessel.” See, 
e.g., The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17, 31 (1903); Cope v. Vallette Dry-Dock 
Co., 119 U.S. 625, 625 (1887); Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & 
Dock. Co., 513 U.S. 527, 535 (1995). 
 126 Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 743. 
 127 Id. at 741 (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 3) (2012)) (emphasis in original). 
 128 Id. at 741–43. 
 129 Id. at 742 (citing Evansville & Bowling Green Packet Co. v. Chero Cola 
Bottling Co., 271 U.S. 19, 46 (1926)). 
 130 Id. (quoting Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 484 (2005)). 
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finding that a floating drydock was not a vessel because it was per-
manently affixed to a wharf,131 and Grubart, finding that a barge 
sometimes used for transportation was a vessel,132 as consistent with 
its conclusion in Lozman in relying on the consideration that, unlike 
the barge in Grubart, Lozman’s floating structure was not regularly, 
nor primarily, used for transportation purposes.133 Suffice it to say 
that the Court’s engagement with its own precedent is perfunctory, 
at least as compared with its usual practice in admiralty cases. Less 
than a decade earlier, for example, the Court in Stewart showed con-
siderably more attention to precedent, citing a total of thirty-one 
cases in the course of its majority opinion. The Lozman court cited 
only twenty-two cases, a decrease of nearly one-third as compared 
to Stewart; the majority cited only one more case than Justice So-
tomayor cited in her dissent.134 
The Court also maintained that their finding of no vessel status 
on the basis of the “reasonable observer” test was consistent with 
“the purposes of major federal maritime statutes.”135 The Court cites 
as examples the attachment procedure established by the Federal 
Maritime Lien Act,136 the purpose of which is to allow plaintiffs to 
seize a vessel as a security interest for “provision of ‘necessaries to 
a vessel’” given the possibility that the vessel may sail away to es-
cape liability,137 and the Limitation of Liability Act,138 which “can 
encourage shipowners to engage in port-related commerce.”139 Be-
cause the Petitioner Lozman “cannot easily escape liability by sail-
ing away in his home” and “does not significantly engage in port-
                                                                                                             
 131 Id. at 743 (citing Cope v. Vallette Dry-Dock Co., 119 U.S. 625, 627 (1887). 
 132 Id. (citing Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock. Co., 
513 U.S. 527, 535 (1995)). The Court in Grubart, however, offered no reasoned 
argument as to why the barge was a vessel, as that finding was never challenged 
by Petitioners in the case. Grubart, 513 U.S. at 535 (“Petitioners do not here se-
riously dispute the conclusion of each court below that the Great Lakes barge is, 
for admiralty tort purposes, a ‘vessel.’”). 
 133 Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 743. 
 134 See infra, Part III.B. 
 135 Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 743–44. 
 136 See id. See also 46 U.S.C. §§ 31341–31343 (2012). 
 137 Id. at 739 (citing 46 U.S.C. § 31342 (2012)). 
 138 See 46 U.S.C. § 30505 (2012). 
 139 Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 744. 
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related commerce[,]”140 there is little reason to classifying his float-
ing structure as a vessel.141 
Regarding the brief attention given to the purpose of federal 
maritime statutes, it is worth noting one thing the Court declined to 
do, which is to ask the broader question of whether the introduction 
of the unprecedented “reasonable observer” test and its application 
which rendered Lozman’s floating structure not a vessel, served the 
purposes of the whole of federal maritime law, including both stat-
utes and general maritime law. If the Court would have recalled that 
the “‘fundamental interest’ giving rise to maritime jurisdiction is 
‘the protection of maritime commerce[,]’”142 the claim that Lozman 
did not significantly engage in port-related commerce would have 
suggested a more palatable resolution to the case. It would have been 
much more consistent with its precedent for the Court to reason that 
Lozman’s floating structure was a vessel under the broad Section 3 
definition, but that nonetheless there was no federal interest in ap-
plying federal law in the case. For example, the Court could have 
found that the dispute between Lozman and the City of Riviera 
Beach was “maritime but local,” and therefore that Florida state law 
should apply,143 just as it had in prior proceedings in Florida state 
                                                                                                             
 140 Id. 
 141 The factual assertions here are dubious at best. As the Court acknowledges, 
Lozman could sail away and did in fact do so several times, albeit under tow; 
moreover, Lozman was engaged in standard maritime commercial activity in be-
ing party to a dockage agreement with the city of Riviera Beach. See Lozman, 133 
S. Ct. at 739. 
 142 Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 25 (2004) (quoting Exxon Corp. 
v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc., 500 U.S. 603, 608 (1991)). 
 143 See W. Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921) (citing S. Pac. Co. v. 
Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917)), where the Court held that an admiralty action for 
the wrongful death of a longshoreman killed while working on an anchored ship 
in San Francisco Bay was barred by California’s one-year statute of limitations 
on the ground that: 
The subject is maritime and local in character and the specified 
modification of or supplement to the rule applied in admiralty 
courts, when following the common law, will not work material 
prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime 
law, nor interfere with the proper harmony and uniformity of 
that law in its international and interstate relations. 
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court between Lozman and Riviera Beach.144 Or it could have held 
that Florida’s interest in regulating dockage agreements between a 
city and the owner of a structure that functions as the owner’s float-
ing home outweighs any federal interest in regulating them.145 Or 
the Court could have declined to apply federal law in order to “ac-
commodate” the local, state interest in regulating the dispute.146 Or 
the Court could have resorted to the more general and entrenched 
Jensen test, according to which Florida law could apply because it 
did not “contravene[] the essential purpose expressed by an act of 
Congress” or “interfere[] with the proper harmony and uniformity 
of that law in its international and interstate relations.”147 This sort 
of argument would have avoided the need to fashion a new interpre-
tation of 1 U.S.C. § 3 from whole cloth, and would have expressed, 
arguably more coherently in regards to the body of federal maritime 
                                                                                                             
See also Robertson & Sturley, supra note 63, at 432 (describing the dispute be-
tween Lozman and the City of Riviera Beach, prior to the granting of certiorari, 
as “a local human-interest story with an eccentric cast of characters[.]”). 
 144 See City of Riviera Beach v. Lozman, 649 F.3d 1259, 1263 (11th Cir. 
2011). 
 145 An approach suggested in Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 
623, 628 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 738–
42 (1961) (“Where substantive law is involved, we think that the Supreme Court’s 
past decisions yield no single, comprehensive test as to where harmony is required 
and when uniformity must be maintained. Rather, the decisions however couched 
reflect a balancing of the state and federal interests in any given case.”)). 
 146 See Kossick, 365 U.S. at 739 (citations omitted): 
[T]he fact that maritime law is—in a special sense at least—
federal law and therefore supreme by virtue of Article VI of the 
Constitution, carries with it the implication that wherever a 
maritime interest is involved, no matter how slight or marginal, 
it must displace a local interest, no matter how pressing and sig-
nificant. But the process is surely rather one of accommodation, 
entirely familiar in many areas of overlapping state and federal 
concern, or a process somewhat analogous to the normal con-
flict of laws situation where two sovereignties assert divergent 
interests in a transaction as to which both have some concern. 
Surely the claim of federal supremacy is adequately served by 
the availability of a federal forum in the first instance and of 
review in this Court to provide assurance that the federal inter-
est is correctly assessed and accorded due weight. 
 147 Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216. 
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law, the Court’s judgment that federal law should not be concerned 
with Lozman’s floating structure and ones like it. However, because 
the Court saw its task from the beginning as merely giving an inter-
pretation of a statutory definition, these strategies and arguments 
were not salient, and so ab initio foreclosed. 
A final, distinctive aspect of the Court’s opinion which has not 
been noted, much less discussed, in the scholarly treatments of the 
case148 is the Appendix, in which the Court attached a photo of the 
floating structure at issue in the case, as well as a 1928 photo of a 
wharfboat similar to the one from Evansville, on which the Court 
also declined to confer vessel status.149 The Court’s inclusion of 
photographs of a floating structure, or of any sort of maritime appa-
ratus, is unprecedented in admiralty, and the purpose of including 
them in this case is far from clear.150 It has been cogently argued that 
the Court’s general practice of attaching photographs to its opinions 
is fraught with problems.151 In this regard, Lozman is no exception. 
The observation that “[v]isual attachments are much more likely to 
                                                                                                             
 148 For example, in an otherwise exhaustive discussion of the Lozman litiga-
tion, the Appendix to the Court’s opinion is mentioned only in passing. See, e.g., 
Robertson, supra note 63, at 417 n.140. 
 149 See Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 747–48. 
 150 Prior to Lozman, no attachment of any sort (photograph, map, replica, re-
production, etc.) has ever been included in a Supreme Court majority opinion in 
admiralty. In only one other admiralty case, Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 
U.S. 585, 605 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting), in which the Court had to determine 
whether the plaintiffs were given fair notice of a forum-selection clause which 
appeared on their passage contract tickets, Justice Stevens in his dissent repro-
duced images of the ticket as part of his argument that notice was not reasonable. 
Id. 
 151 See Hampton Dellinger, Words Are Enough: The Troublesome Use of Pho-
tographs, Maps, and Other Images in Supreme Court Opinions, 110 HARV. L. 
REV. 1704, 1753 (1997) (citation omitted): 
The legal documents that have bound and bettered our nation—
from the Declaration of Independence to Brown v. Board of Ed-
ucation—have been plain and unencumbered, yet clear and 
powerful. A review of the Supreme Court’s use of photographs, 
maps, replicas, and reproductions shows the items generally to 
be incompatible with such ideals . . . .Unless the Court is willing 
to adopt measures to enhance the accuracy of visual attach-
ments, or at least disclose their inherent distortions, this unnec-
essary practice should stop. 
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obscure the best available legal answer rather than reveal it”152 is 
particularly apt here. The photographs present a limited, two-dimen-
sional perspective on the structures, from which little information 
can be gleaned concerning their relevant physical characteristics (es-
pecially their subsurface features which cannot be seen, but would 
provide important details as to design, structure, and possible uses). 
Nor is the relevance, value, or intended use of these pictures ever 
explained by the Court. The inclusion of the pictures in the major-
ity’s opinion is even more baffling upon examination of the occa-
sions and purposes for which they are cited. Some of the allegedly 
relevant features of the two floating structures mentioned in the 
opinion are not even depicted in the photographs. For example, in 
the initial description of the res at issue in Lozman, the Court lists 
“a sitting room, bedroom, closet, bathroom, and kitchen, along with 
a stairway leading to a second level with office space. An empty 
bilge space underneath the main floor kept it afloat.”153 None of 
these features appear in the attached photograph; indeed, given the 
physical dimensions of the structure, it would be difficult or impos-
sible for all these features to be captured in a single photograph. 
Moreover, some of the features for which the photographs are in-
tended to be illustrations cannot be depicted at all. In citing the pho-
tograph of a 1928 wharfboat similar to the one at issue in Evansville, 
the majority cited such supposedly relevant characteristics as that it 
was “‘not used to carry freight from one place to another,’” and that 
it did not “‘encounter perils of navigation to which crafts used for 
transportation are exposed.’”154 These features cannot, even in prin-
ciple, be represented in a synchronic two-dimensional representa-
tion of the structure, since the characteristics are diachronic and re-
lational (e.g., by making implicit reference to the activities of those 
employed on it, as well as the nature and frequency of navigational 
activity in the waters adjacent to the structure). 
                                                                                                             
 152 Id. 
 153 Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 739 (citations omitted). 
 154 Id. at 742 (quoting Evansville & Bowling Green Packet Co. v. Chero Cola 
Bottling Co., 271 U.S. 19, 22 (1926)). 
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Justice Breyer once characterized himself, in reference to his ju-
dicial method, as “a bringer of chaos.”155 In Lozman’s majority opin-
ion, he delivered. The “reasonable observer” test purports to respond 
to a narrow problem of statutory construction, but consequently re-
flects a blinkered view of over a century of precedent which ad-
dresses both vessel status and the appropriateness of applying (or 
choosing not to apply) federal maritime law to a maritime dispute 
that is primarily of local, state concern. The result is a vague stand-
ard which offers limited guidance (if any) to lower courts and the 
many private actors in national and international maritime indus-
tries. 
B. Justice Sotomayor’s Dissent 
In contrast to the majority’s ex nihilo reasoning, Justice So-
tomayor does dwell at greater length in her dissent on the Court’s 
vessel status precedent, as well as that of the circuits, perhaps in light 
of the Court’s acknowledgement in Stewart that 1 U.S.C. § 3’s def-
inition of “vessel” “merely codified the meaning that the term ‘ves-
sel’ had acquired in general maritime law.”156 She seems to go fur-
ther, by intimating that she fundamentally disagrees with the way 
the majority has characterized its task in the case, i.e., to engage only 
in an exercise of statutory construction of the Section 3 definition. 
She states that “several important principles have guided both this 
Court and the lower courts in determining what kinds of watercraft 
fall properly within the scope of admiralty jurisdiction,”157 and yet 
all of the principles she identified are rooted in the Court’s vessel 
status jurisprudence and bear no fundamental relationship to Section 
3 or any other federal statute. 
Of the majority’s “reasonable observer” test, Justice Sotomayor 
said pointedly: “This phrasing [“reasonable observer”] has never ap-
peared in any of our cases.”158 This is a polite way of saying that the 
                                                                                                             
 155 GARRETT EPPS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 2014: NINE CLASHING VISIONS ON THE 
SUPREME COURT 97 (2014) (citations omitted). 
 156 Stewart v. Durtra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 490 (2005). This explicit ref-
erence to the general maritime law is the only reference to it found in Lozman, 
either in the majority opinion or dissent. See Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 742. 
 157 Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 749 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting). 
 158 Id. at 751 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting). 
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majority is just making stuff up. She repeatedly criticized the inex-
plicable, a priori approach the majority took to developing the test, 
an approach that is patently inconsistent with developing admiralty 
law in the manner of a common law court, by drawing on the prin-
ciples found in the Court’s own cases, as it has done for two centu-
ries: 
Certainly, difficult and marginal cases will arise. 
Fortunately, courts do not consider each floating 
structure anew. So, for example, when we were con-
fronted in Stewart with the question whether a dredge 
is a § 3 vessel, we did not commence with a clean 
slate; we instead sought guidance from previous 
cases that had confronted similar structures . . . .In 
sum, our precedents offer substantial guidance for 
how objectively to determine whether a watercraft is 
practically capable of maritime transport and thus 
qualifies as a § 3 vessel.159 
As a result of “commenc[ing] with a clean slate[,]” the major-
ity’s test has “render[ed] the § 3 inquiry opaque and unpredicta-
ble”160 and “completely malleable.”161 By impliedly overruling 
many early cases on vessel status, “the majority works real damage 
to what has long been a settled area of maritime law[,]”162 and “will 
confuse the lower courts and upset our longstanding admiralty prec-
edent.”163 
She agreed with the majority’s criticism of the Eleventh’s Cir-
cuit’s test as overbroad, and conceded that subjective intention 
should “play no role in the vessel analysis of 1 U.S.C. § 3,”164 but 
suggested that the Court’s reasoning “despite its seemingly objec-
tive gloss, effectively (and erroneously) introduces a subjective 
component into the vessel-status inquiry.”165 The subjectivity arises 
                                                                                                             
 159 Id. at 750–51 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 160 Id. at 750–52 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting). 
 161 Id. at 753 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting). 
 162 Id. at 753 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing The Ark, 17 F.2d 446, 447 
(S.D. Fla. 1926)). 
 163 Id. at 755 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 164 Id. at 748 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 165 Id. at 751 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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from the majority’s unexplained emphasis on what Justice So-
tomayor calls merely “esthetic elements” of Lozman’s floating 
structure, like “French doors” and “ordinary windows,” which have 
“no relationship to maritime transport.”166 She suggests that if such 
elements really are relevant under the “reasonable observer” test, 
then the majority has not explained why they are relevant to the Sec-
tion 3 inquiry, and is therefore essentially suggesting an “I know it 
when I see it” standard.167 Her criticism of the majority’s multiple 
references to the prima facie irrelevant “esthetic” elements of Loz-
man’s floating structure, as support for their application of the “rea-
sonable observer” test, is consistent with my earlier criticisms as to 
the uselessness and irrelevance of the photograph of the floating 
structure included in the Appendix of the majority opinion.168 
IV.  THE “NORMALIZATION” OF ADMIRALTY LAW: A PRIMER 
There has been considerable scholarly reaction to the Court’s 
reasoning in Lozman, much of it critical, and discussion of the pos-
sible practical consequences of the case for various sectors of mari-
time commerce.169 As we have seen, the case is unusual in several 
                                                                                                             
 166 Id. at 751–752 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 167 Id. at 751–52 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 
U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
 168 See supra, Part III.A. 
 169 See, e.g., Stewart F. Peck & David B. Sharpe, What is a Vessel?: Implica-
tions for Marine Finance, Marine Insurance, and Admiralty Jurisdiction, 89 TUL. 
L. REV. 1103, 1104–07 (2015); Daniel Faessler, Defining a Vessel in Admiralty: 
“I Know It When I See It”, 26 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 248, 248 (2014); J. Neale 
deGravelles, Uncertainty in Vessel Status After Lozman v. Riviera Beach, Flor-
ida: An Analysis and Review of Recent Developments, 14 LOY. MAR. L. J. 56, 73 
(2014); Robertson & Sturley, supra note 63, at 394; Megan C. White, Comment, 
Back in the Same Boat: Vessel Status after Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 7 
CHARLESTON L. REV. 559, 601–03 (2013); Caroline E. Frilot, Comment, Crisis 
Averted: The Supreme Court Rejects a Subjective Vessel Status Test in Lozman v. 
City of Riviera Beach, Florida, 38 TUL. MAR. L.J. 215, 229–30 (2013); Kenneth 
G. Engerrand, Vessel Status Reconsidered, 11 LOY. MAR. L. J. 213, 267–70 
(2013); Lindsey C. Brock III, The Practical Effects of Lozman, 38 TUL. MAR. L.J. 
89, 101–02 (2013); Kathryn Yankowski, Comment, Whatever Floats the “Rea-
sonable Observer’s” Boat: An Examination of Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 
Fla. and the Supreme Court’s Ruling That Floating Homes Are Not Vessels, 67 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 975, 997 (2013); Raul J. Chacon Jr. & Adam T. Ferguson, All 
That Floats is Not a Boat: The Supreme Court’s Lozman Decision Makes Waves 
Impacting Multiple Areas of Law, TRIAL ADVOC. Q., Summer 2013, at 11; David 
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respects: the dubious ex ante case for granting certiorari,170 the ex-
ceptional facts of the case (including the uniqueness of the floating 
structure at issue) vis-à-vis the normal concerns of federal admiralty 
law, the course of the oral argument,171 the Court’s fashioning a new 
vessel status test completely independently of its own line of cases 
extending back over a century,172 and the subsequent public, extra-
judicial comments173 made about the case by the Chief Justice. My 
aim in the remainder of the Article is to suggest that these aspects of 
the case are best understood as indications of a trend towards the 
Supreme Court transforming its role in its capacity as an admiralty 
court, by abdicating its traditional and constitutionally mandated 
duty to engage broadly in federal common lawmaking in admiralty. 
The Court is increasingly showing a preference to see itself as 
“sail[ing] in occupied waters,”174 that is, to allow Congress to take 
the lead in creating substantive law in the area, and then to make law 
only when necessary, to fill in gaps created by federal statute with 
little regard for the long history of its cases being the primary source 
of law in admiralty.175 
According to some scholars who have developed sophisticated 
views expressing familiar concerns about separation of powers and 
federalism in relation to the Court’s traditional role in admiralty,176 
these are welcome developments. In this section, I first summarize 
these views, which suggest that federal admiralty law should be 
“normalized” and treated like most other areas of federal law, with 
respect to the scope of the lawmaking powers of the federal 
courts.177 In the next section, I show that the otherwise inexplicable 
aspects of Lozman which I have discussed, are explained by the 
Court’s implicit preference for normalization and, moreover, that 
                                                                                                             
R. Maass, Comment, If It Looks Like a Vessel: The Supreme Court’s “Reasonable 
Observer” Test for Vessel Status, 65 FLA. L. REV. 905–06 (2013). 
 170 See Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 740. 
 171 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 77 at *2, 5, 8. 
 172 See Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 749. 
 173 See Chief Justice John Roberts Remarks, supra note 64. 
 174 Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 36 (1990) (“We sail in occupied 
waters. Maritime tort law is now dominated by federal statute, and we are not free 
to expand remedies at will . . . .”). 
 175 See generally id. at 27,36–37. 
 176 See, e.g., The Last Brooding Omnipresence, supra note 3, at 1350. 
 177 See, e.g., It’s Just Water, supra note 11, at 480. 
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the vices of Lozman reflect the corresponding vices of a normaliza-
tion approach in admiralty cases. In that sense, while a general, sys-
tematic critique of normalization deserves its own independent dis-
cussion, Lozman nonetheless serves as a pragmatic argument 
against normalization of admiralty. In this case, at least, the imple-
mentation of a normalization approach by the Court, an approach 
which served as a set of background assumptions about the proper 
method of judicial decision on the vessel status issue, lead to a num-
ber of independently undesirable results. Before elaborating further 
on those, however, I first turn to the substantive arguments for the 
normalization of federal admiralty law. 
Over the last two decades, several federal courts scholars, and 
especially Ernest Young in a series of articles, have argued that the 
federal courts’ long-practiced federal common lawmaking powers 
in admiralty, independent of Congressional action, are unconstitu-
tional.178 The argument begins with, and largely rests on, a particular 
understanding of the original constitutional grant.179 The central 
claim is that both the Article III grant, extending the judicial power 
to “all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,”180 along with 
its statutory counterpart, the Judiciary Act of 1789, extending “orig-
inal cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime juris-
diction” on the federal district courts181 are merely jurisdictional 
grants, and neither the Constitution nor the Judiciary Act make any 
                                                                                                             
 178 See, e.g., The Last Brooding Omnipresence, supra note 3, at 1357–58; see 
also Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 291 
(1999) [hereinafter Preemption at Sea]; It’s Just Water, supra note 11, at 476–77; 
Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal Common Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1639, 1655–67 (2008) [hereinafter Preemption and Federal Common Law]. 
Others have argued along broadly similar lines. See Bradford R. Clark, Federal 
Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1341–60 
(1996) (arguing that federal courts may not make federal common law regarding 
private maritime claims); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal 
Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 894–95 (1986) (arguing against most forms 
of federal common law, including admiralty); Martin H. Redish, FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 146–47 (2d ed. 
1990) (arguing for the complete abolition of the “so-called ‘law of the sea’”) (ci-
tation omitted). 
 179 See Field, supra note 171, at 890–91. 
 180 U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2. 
 181 The Judiciary Act, ch. 20, 1 Stat. § 9 (1789) (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. § 1333 (2012)). 
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reference to substantive lawmaking power.182 The federal courts’ 
power to make federal law in admiralty would therefore presump-
tively be subject to the same limitations on their power to make law 
in other areas of federal law. 
Those limitations were established in Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins, which held that “[e]xcept in matters governed by the Fed-
eral Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any 
case is the law of the State . . . .There is no federal general common 
law.”183 The result was what has been called the “new federal com-
mon law,”184 in which federal courts are empowered to make federal 
common law in a very narrow range of cases: either in cases in 
which doing so would protect a “uniquely federal interest,”185 or 
those in which Congress has overtly or implicitly delegated to the 
Court the authority to fill in the gaps of federal statutory schemes.186 
The post-Erie world is therefore one in which, as Justice Holmes 
famously remarked, “[t]he common law is not a brooding omnipres-
ence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign. . . that 
can be identified.”187 And, so the argument goes, from the point of 
view of a sound federalism, this is just as it should be, since in the 
courts’ most common task of interstitial lawmaking, “Congress has 
made the primary legislative judgment in such cases and the states 
are politically represented in that process.”188 The argument for the 
normalization of admiralty law claims that this is precisely what is 
lacking in the making of general federal common law in admiralty: 
“In admiralty . . . courts generally make law wholly apart from any 
                                                                                                             
 182 See Preemption and Federal Common Law, supra note 171, at 1672–73. 
 183 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), overruling Swift v. 
Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1842) (holding that, absent an applicable state statute, 
the federal courts were free to develop general federal commercial law sitting in 
diversity jurisdiction). 
 184 See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common 
Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 421– 22 (1964). 
 185 See Tex. Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (citing 
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964)). 
 186 See D’Oench, Duhme & Co., Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 
470 (1942). 
 187 S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 188 The Last Brooding Omnipresence, supra note 3, at 1353. 
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federal statute, and the separation of powers and federalism prob-
lems [of Congressional guidance and state representation] become 
more compelling.”189 
It is ironic, but not coincidental, that when Justice Holmes railed 
against the “brooding omnipresence” of federal common law,190 he 
was writing on the losing side of an admiralty case decided twenty-
one years before Erie, Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen,191 in which the 
Court held that federal general maritime law, i.e., law made by the 
Court independently of Congress, pre-empted state legislation on 
the grounds that: 
[N]o such legislation is valid if it contravenes the es-
sential purpose expressed by an act of Congress or 
works material prejudice to the characteristic fea-
tures of the general maritime law or interferes with 
the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its 
international and interstate relations.192 
Thus, Jensen sets out a strong, and clear, default rule of maritime 
pre-emption according to which judicially-made federal maritime 
law (in the language of Jensen, “the general maritime law”) will 
standardly pre-empt state law, regardless of whether it is statutory 
or common law.193 Jensen remains good law,194 and subsequently, 
the Court stressed the irrelevance of the Erie doctrine in the realm 
of admiralty law.195 
                                                                                                             
 189 Id. 
 190 Jensen, 244 U.S. at 222 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 191 Id. at 205. 
 192 Id. at 216. 
 193 See id. 
 194 See Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 447 n.1 (1994) (“[W]e think 
it inappropriate to overrule Jensen in dictum, and without argument or even invi-
tation.”). 
 195 See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 410–11 (1953) (holding 
that general maritime law, and not state common law, governed a maritime tort 
claim, regardless of whether the case was brought in admiralty, diversity, or some 
other basis). See also Joel K. Goldstein, Federal Common Law in Admiralty: An 
Introduction to the Beginning of an Exchange, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 1337, 1344 
(1999) (noting some scholars have summarized the Court’s position in Pope as 
“the Erie limitation [does] not apply at sea.”); Theodore F. Stevens, Erie R.R. v. 
Tompkins and the Uniform General Maritime Law, 64 HARV. L. REV. 246, 270 
(1950) (internal citations omitted): 
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However, according to the argument for the normalization of ad-
miralty law, since the legitimacy of the Court’s reasoning in Jensen 
rests on a number of dubious assumptions, Jensen was wrongly de-
cided and is therefore unconstitutional.196 Examination of the 
originalist arguments regarding the fundamental purpose of the Ar-
ticle III admiralty grant shows that the Framers primarily had in 
mind certain categories of (now rare) public law cases, such as prize 
and capture cases and piracy, and though they almost certainly were 
aware that the grant would cover private maritime claims,197 this 
falls far short of the view that the Court is vested with the power to 
make substantive admiralty rules independent of Congress, much 
less establishes the strong pre-emption principle of Jensen.198 More-
over, on an originalist understanding of the general maritime law in 
the Founding era, it was derived from the law of nations and so not 
properly characterized as either state or federal law.199 From this 
                                                                                                             
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins rests solely upon the principle that state 
courts should have the power to determine the scope and effec-
tiveness of rights created by the states in the exercise of their 
Constitutional powers. Similarly, admiralty courts, through the 
federal judicial power conferred by the Constitution, have 
adopted or created a certain body of legal principles, which, re-
gardless of their source, must be uniformly applied. It may be 
that this is merely another form of ‘federal common law’ mas-
querading under a title of the general maritime law. If this is 
true, so long as a state will provide a jurisdiction in which its 
residents may seek a common law remedy, it becomes even 
more apparent that federal diversity courts are not bound by 
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins on maritime issues. 
Stevens was writing before Pope was decided. 
 196 See The Last Brooding Omnipresence, supra note 3, at 1362. This may be 
overstating the strength of Young’s conclusion, for one way to read his argument 
suggests that Jensen is simply out of step with the modern rule allowing the 
preemption of state law by federal statute (Id. at 1356). However, the subsequent 
historical argument (Id. at 1357–63) he makes implies that Jensen, when decided, 
relied on a number of illicit historical fictions. See id. 
 197 See Jonathan M. Guthoff, Admiralty, Article III, and Supreme Court Re-
view of State-Court Decisionmaking, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2169, 2178 n.25 (1996). 
 198 See The Last Brooding Omnipresence, supra note 3, at 1358–60. 
 199 See id. at 1360. 
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perspective, the significance of Jensen is that it “essentially federal-
ized the general maritime law[.]”200 But if so, then the original Arti-
cle III grant, or the 1789 Judiciary Act, cannot be read as implicit 
delegations of federal lawmaking authority to the federal courts.201 
Finally, in regards to Jensen’s explicit call for uniformity “in its in-
ternational and interstate relations[,]”202 coupled with the implied 
assumption that the Supreme Court is best suited to create and main-
tain that uniformity, the reply in favor of normalization is that wor-
ries about uniformity are overstated in admiralty and are no more 
serious than in other areas of federal law, particularly those that have 
some connection to foreign affairs, and federal statutes have proven 
to be means just as effective in bringing about the desired degree of 
uniformity.203 
The argument for normalization has several other twists and 
turns which, for present purposes, need not detain us. Young use-
fully encapsulates the normalization approach this way: 
Judge-made federal common law is legitimate be-
cause of—and only to the extent of—its connection 
to democratic enactments; most of the general mari-
time law’s applications, however, cannot meet this 
standard. Preemption by judge-made law is even 
more problematic than simple common lawmaking; 
given our system’s primary reliance on Congress as 
the protector of state regulatory prerogatives, 
preemption is extremely difficult to justify in the ab-
sence of legislative action.204 
V.  LOST AT SEA: LOZMAN AND THE VICES OF NORMALIZATION 
The argument that admiralty law should be “normalized” vis-à-
vis other areas of federal law is clearly complex and turns out to 
include a number of interdependent claims regarding the legitimacy 
                                                                                                             
 200 It’s Just Water, supra note 11, at 485. 
 201 See id. 
 202 S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917). 
 203 See Preemption at Sea, supra note 171, at 305–06. 
 204 Id. at 277 (emphasis in original). 
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or illegitimacy of federal common lawmaking powers of the Su-
preme Court,205 the extent to which federal common law in admi-
ralty should displace state law,206 and the proper understanding of 
the relation between the general maritime law and federal admiralty 
statutes, among others.207 The case for the normalization of admi-
ralty is a powerful one, but I believe it is ultimately mistaken in sev-
eral fundamental aspects. A comprehensive critique of it, however, 
will have to wait for another occasion.208 I have introduced the nor-
malization argument because it is an illuminating lens through 
which to view the oddities of Lozman. The case, in turn, helps illu-
minate why normalizing admiralty law, whether or not justified by 
concerns of federalism and separation of powers, is pragmatically 
objectionable, since it tends to produce bad outcomes (along a num-
ber of familiar metrics, such as certainty, clarity, and predictability) 
when the Court adopts the tenets of normalization as part of its ju-
dicial methodology in admiralty cases.209 
First, and most importantly, the implicit adoption of the normal-
ization approach by the Court explains its overwhelming focus in 
Lozman, throughout both the oral argument and the majority’s opin-
ion, on 1 U.S.C. §3, the only Congressional enactment of relevance 
in the case. It also explains the corresponding scant attention the 
Court paid to its own line of vessel status cases, which extends back 
to the nineteenth century,210 indeed a line of cases older than the 
1873 Section 3 statutory definition.211 The implicit acceptance of a 
normalization approach also explains the lack of attention given in 
                                                                                                             
 205 See id. at 281. See also David J. Sharpe, Admiralty Jurisdiction: The Power 
Over Cases, 79 TUL. L. REV. 1149, 1160–61 (2005). 
 206 See id. at 305–06. 
 207 See id. at 318. 
 208 Suffice it to say the view has attracted a fair amount of critical discussion. 
See David W. Denton, Jr., Lifting “The Great Shroud of the Sea”: A Customary 
International Law Approach to the Domestic Application of Maritime Law, 37 
TUL. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2012); Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Fed-
eral Common Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 585, 617–19 (2006); Sharpe, supra note 
205, at 1160–61; Louise Weinberg, Back to the Future: The New General Com-
mon Law, 35 J. MAR. L. & COM. 523, 535–38 (2004); Jonathan M. Gutoff, Federal 
Common Law and Congressional Delegation: A Reconceptualization of Admi-
ralty, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 367, 375–86 (2000). 
 209 See generally Gutoff, supra note 193, at 379–84. 
 210 See, e.g., Crapo v. Kelly, 83 U.S. 610, 631–32 (1872). 
 211 See, e.g., Greeley v. U.S., 21 U.S. 257, 257 (1823). 
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the case to the general purposes of a definition of “vessel” in the 
broader context of federal admiralty law (whether that law is statu-
tory or judge-made), in particular to the fact that a vessel status test 
is only one among many used to determine admiralty jurisdiction in 
a given case, whether the test is otherwise provided by statute,212 or 
is a test which has been developed by the Court independently of 
Congress.213 This myopic exercise in statutory construction makes 
sense only on the presumption that the limits of the Court’s common 
lawmaking powers are determined by prior Congressional action, 
which is precisely one of the core claims in the argument for nor-
malization.214 
Second, a presumption in favor of normalizing admiralty would 
begin to explain why the Court granted certiorari on Lozman in the 
first place. Despite the many compelling reasons there were against 
the Supreme Court taking the case,215 if the Court viewed its role ex 
ante as resolving an intra-circuit conflict centered only on the inter-
pretation of a definition provided by a federal statute, then the 
uniqueness of Lozman’s floating structure would rather count in fa-
vor of, and not against, the granting of certiorari. Merely interpreting 
a statute invited the court to play “the law school game,” as Justice 
                                                                                                             
 212 See, e.g., Admiralty Extension Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30101(a) (2012) (extend-
ing admiralty jurisdiction to “cases of injury or damage, to person or property, 
caused by a vessel on navigable waters, even though the injury or damage is done 
or consummated on land.”) 
 213 See Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 
527, 534 (1995) (holding that a tort must occur on navigable waters for admiralty 
tort jurisdiction, which requires that the incident could have “a potentially disrup-
tive impact on maritime commerce” and that the “general character” of the “ac-
tivity giving rise to the incident” shows a “substantial relationship to traditional 
maritime activity.”) (citations omitted). 
 214 See Chief Justice Roberts Remarks, supra note 64. These remarks by Chief 
Justice Robert’s involve another non-admiralty case decided in the same (2012–
2013) term as Lozman and regarded the proper role of the federal judiciary in 
regard to the constitutionality of same sex marriage. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 
133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013) (“Federal courts have authority under the Constitu-
tion to answer such questions only if necessary to do so in the course of deciding 
an actual ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ . . . .This is an essential limit on our power: It 
ensures that we act as judges, and do not engage in policymaking properly left to 
elected representatives.”) (emphasis in original). While itself a fairly standard 
conservative call for judicial restraint, it also aptly characterizes the Court’s ap-
proach in deciding Lozman. 
 215 See supra Part II. 
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Kennedy called it,216 and, as we have seen, that game requires im-
agining far-fetched and often absurd examples to test the appropri-
ateness of a definition; in fact, the more far-fetched, the better. The 
novelty of Lozman’s floating structure gave the court an actual far-
fetched case to consider. Therefore, the otherwise irrelevant “float-
ing home” in controversy facilitated, rather than hindered, the quasi-
Socratic, definitional “game” of throwing up for consideration im-
aginary examples and counter-examples. 
Third, the apparent levity with which the Court decided the case 
can also be explained by an implicit adoption of the strategy of nor-
malization of admiralty law. In so far as the Court was taking up a 
normalizing role in Lozman, and mostly setting aside its earlier 
cases, as well as a comprehensive approach to protecting maritime 
commerce, it would make sense that Chief Justice Roberts would 
characterize the case as one of the Court’s “littler” ones. The task of 
interpreting a single word in a statute is admittedly a more modest 
one as compared to a case within a complex statutory environment 
(e.g., at the intersection of immigration and criminal law),217 or a 
case involving a controversial political issue (e.g., same-sex mar-
riage).218 
And yet, just as the Court’s implicit commitment to normalizing 
admiralty provides useful context for understanding Lozman, its 
many objectionable aspects are likewise attributable to it being a de-
cisive step in the direction of normalization. The case in fact demon-
strates the pragmatic difficulties, and troublesome consequences, of 
attempting to make admiralty “normal” in relation to the rest of fed-
eral law and the Court’s powers in shaping it. The normalization 
project amounts to the Court abandoning its traditional and consti-
tutionally mandated duty under Article III to fashion rules and prin-
ciples of decision for maritime disputes. These judicially-crafted 
rules and principles have been reasonably stable and consistent for 
                                                                                                             
 216 See Transcript, supra note 65, at 8. 
 217 See, e.g., Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1686–87 (2013) (holding 
that a non-citizens arrest for intent to distribute marijuana was not for an aggra-
vated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act). 
 218 See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2663, 2667–68 (holding the Petitioner did 
not have standing to appeal ruling in lower court on the constitutionality of Cali-
fornia’s Proposition 8, a referendum on same-sex marriage). 
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decades, in many cases for centuries, and normalization has the po-
tential to profoundly disrupt that stability. In Lozman, as the latest 
example of a dramatic escalation in normalizing admiralty, that po-
tential became a reality, and with undesirable consequences. The re-
sult of implicitly endorsing normalization in the case was an unpre-
dictable and blind act of deference to federal statute, which then 
made it possible for the Court to engage in irrelevant reasoning over 
a range of trivial and absurd examples. That reasoning then pro-
duced an unprecedented, ex nihilo test for vessel status, a test which 
provides little guidance to lower courts, and one which will continue 
to confound those in the private sectors which make up the vital na-
tional and international economy of maritime trade. 
An advocate for normalizing admiralty may respond that a prag-
matic argument against it, even if valid on its own terms, is surely 
outweighed by the more entrenched values of safeguarding federal-
ism and maintaining separation of powers: 
While pragmatic concerns enter into constitutional 
law in a number of contexts, the fact that a particular 
legal regime is more efficient or represents better 
policy will rarely save an otherwise unconstitutional 
law. The Constitution frequently chooses other val-
ues—such as democracy, decentralization, and 
checks and balances—over efficiency, and nowhere 
is this more accurate than in the fields of federalism 
and separation of powers.219 
The response to this argument is that what is at stake in Lozman 
is not merely increased efficiency. The concerns motivating this Ar-
ticle’s criticisms regarding how the Court handled the case, from 
beginning to end, lie elsewhere. The examination of Lozman reveals 
a failure of the Court to rise to the occasion of reasonably granting 
certiorari and reviewing cases with the requisite amount of serious-
ness. The case also demonstrates a failure in providing certainty and 
regularity for all those parties frequently subject to the admiralty law 
of the United States. These latter concerns of certainty and regularity 
are at least as deeply rooted in the American legal tradition as are 
the values of federalism and separation of powers. Certainty and 
                                                                                                             
 219 The Last Brooding Omnipresence, supra note 3, at 1362. 
2017] LOST AT SEA 985 
 
regularity are both traditional core components of the ideal of the 
rule of law, surely a political value which advocates on either side 
of the normalization debate, and across the political spectrum, can 
embrace.220 For the Court to abruptly shift to a normalization ap-
proach in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century is to risk 
compromising certainty and regularity on each and every occasion 
in which it acts in its unique capacity as the American High Court 
of Admiralty. The long-term benefits of such a shift (if indeed there 
are any) are not yet clear; in any case, the principled constitutional 
arguments for normalization have not yet taken account of the wor-
ries expressed here regarding the upholding of rule of law values, as 
well as the Court exercising a requisite amount of seriousness and 
propriety in reviewing admiralty cases. 
CONCLUSION 
The kinds of complaints made in this Article about the apparent 
efforts of the Supreme Court to “normalize” federal admiralty law, 
on full display in Lozman, are not unprecedented. A quarter century 
ago, Judge John R. Brown anticipated the dangers of the Court im-
plementing a process of normalization in admiralty. In criticizing 
the Court’s reasoning in Miles v. Apex,221 he identified the erosion 
of not only the technical expertise of our only national admiralty 
court, but also the increasing tendency for the Court to essentially 
abdicate its Article III responsibility to develop and maintain a co-
herent body of federal law to govern maritime disputes, and instead 
to let Congress take the lead.222 As we have seen in the Lozman case, 
                                                                                                             
 220 See, e.g., FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 208–09 
(1960) (discussing how predictability in law promotes individual liberty by pro-
tecting a sphere of unimpeded private action); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE 207 (Rev. ed. 1999) (discussing the rule of law as requiring the regular 
and impartial application of public rules). 
 221 498 U.S. 19, 21 (1990). 
 222 See Brown, supra note 7, at 282: 
The decision of the Supreme Court to bar recovery of nonpecu-
niary damages in an unseaworthiness claim under the general 
maritime law, based on the olds statute providing a negligence 
remedy which was enacted under Congress’ power to regulate 
commerce, leads to the most strained preemption holding ever 
reached by an American admiralty judge. In essence, the im-
plied effect of the implied provision in a statute enacted under 
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that tendency has become even more pronounced and with problem-
atic results. 
The current prevailing political and ideological orientation of the 
Court is likely to change significantly during the Trump administra-
tion, and it remains to be seen the consequences of those changes 
for the future of federal admiralty law. Those changes will deter-
mine whether the Court will continue to unjustifiably narrow its own 
power with respect to the Article III grant of admiralty jurisdiction, 
or whether it will return to its traditional and constitutionally pre-
scribed role of making rules of decision in admiralty in the manner 
of a common law court.223 If the Court opts for the former alterna-
tive, and continues in the trend of normalization, there are likely 
rough waters ahead. 
                                                                                                             
an implied power of Congress served to eliminate a remedy de-
clared by the admiralty judges of the Supreme Court in exercise 
of their power conferred directly by Constitution. 
(emphasis in original). See also Joel K. Goldstein, The Life and Times of Wilburn 
Boat: A Critical Guide (Part II), 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 555, 590 (1997) (noting 
the Supreme Court’s “recent retreat from its role of expositor of general maritime 
law.”). 
 223 See Young, supra note 3, at 1360–61. 
